USSR-US SUMMIT

Washington, December 7-10, 1987



Documents and Materials

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

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT AT ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE NEAR WASHINGTON

December 7, 1987

Thank you, Mr. Secretary of State, for your words of greetings and for the hospitality. I should like, first of all, on behalf of the people of the Soviet Union, to convey words of greeting and sincere respect to the citizens of the United States of America. On behalf of the people and the government of the Soviet Union, I wish to assure all Americans that we sincerely want better relations between our countries and peoples.

I have arrived in your country on this visit to complete work on, and to sign, the treaty on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, the treaty which all of the nations of the world have been waiting for.

At the center of our discussions with the President of the United States will be questions of reducing strategic offensive arms—the pivotal problem of Soviet-American relations.

We have something to say to American leaders about this main issue and we are hoping that we will hear some new words on their side. We will be discussing other world problems too, of course, problems which are of concern to the nations, problems which are awaiting their solution. We can neither of us shirk our role. We must act with the utmost responsibility to our peoples and the whole world. The very fact of the third Soviet-US Summit and its agenda point to the increased responsibility and understanding of that responsibility by the leaders of the Soviet Union and the leaders of the United States of America. We are in favor of a constructive dialogue and for better relations.

I would like to wish peace and well-being to the American people.

Thank you.

George Shultz met the General Secretary at the airplane.

WELCOMING CEREMONY FOR MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AT THE WHITE HOUSE

December 8, 1987

SPEECH BY RONALD REAGAN

General Secretary, and Mrs. Gorbachev,

I've welcomed a good number of foreign leaders to the White House in these last seven years. And today marks a visit that is perhaps more momentous than many which have preceded it, because it represents a coming together not of allies, but of adversaries.

And yet, I think you'll find during your stay that the American people believe that a stranger is a friend they have yet to meet, and that there is still a wellspring of good will here.

Indeed, I know that many of our citizens have written to you and Mrs. Gorbachev, and have even sent to you the keys to their homes. That honest gesture certainly reflects the feelings of many Americans toward you and Mrs. Gorbachev, and toward your people.

I have often felt that our people should have been better friends long ago. But let us have the courage to recognize that there are weighty differences between our governments and systems—differences that will not go away by wishful thinking or expressions of goodwill, no matter how sincerely delivered.

This uncomfortable reality need not be reason for pessimism however, it should provide us with a challenge—an opportunity to move from confrontation toward cooperation.

Mr. General Secretary, there is a saying in your country that a poor peace is better than a good quarrel. Well, it's up to us with hard work, commitment, and a heavy dose of realism to change the poor peace that has existed between our countries and make it into a good one.

Today we will take a giant step in that direction by signing an historic treaty that will rid the world of an entire class of US and Soviet nuclear weapons. Mr. Gorbachev, 'mir na nas smotrit', the world is watching. And we've got something to show them. And over the next few days, it is my hope that progress will be made toward achieving another agreement

that will lead to the cutting in half of our strategic nuclear arsenals.

Well, during the Second Word War, Soviet general, later Marshal, Chuikov, a frontline commander, liked to tell the story of a soldier who said he had captured a bear, and he was asked to bring it along. "I can't," replied the soldier. "The bear won't let me." Well, General Secretary Gorbachev, like the soldier in Marshal Chuikov's story, our peoples for too long have been both the masters and the captives of a deadly arms race. This situation is not preordained, and not part of some inevitable course of history.

We make history, changing its direction is within our power. However, such change is not easy and can be accomplished only when leaders of both sides have no illusions, talk with candor, and meet differences head-on. Such, I hope, will be the spirit of our upcoming meetings.

On the table will be not only arms reduction, but also human rights issues about which the American people and their government are deeply committed. These are fundamental issues of political morality that touch on the most basic of human concerns.

I would hope we will also candidly discuss regional conflicts. The parties to these conflicts should negotiate solutions that restore the peace and advance the rights and freedom of the peoples involved. We cannot afford to view these as faraway brush fires. Even small flames risk larger conflagrations and undermine positive developments between our two countries.

Let us also consider ways to expand the contact between our own citizens. The Soviet and American people can and should know more about each other. The barriers between them should be taken down, restrictions on travel and communications lifted, personal relations between our young people fostered. Let disagreement between our governments not get in the way of friendship between our peoples.

Mr. Gorbachev, I hope that during your short time here you'll see that we Americans are a dynamic and energetic lot, people of enterprise and an abiding love of freedom. We believe in God and care about others who are in need. We're proud and independent.

Like the peoples of your country, we believe our country should be strong, but we desire peace and no doubt about that. The longing for peace runs deep here, second only to our fervency for the preservation of our liberty.

Americans believe people should be able to disagree and still respect one another, still live in peace with one another—

that is the spirit, the democratic spirit, that I will bring to our meetings.

So, on behalf of myself and Mrs. Reagan, and on behalf of all the citizens of the United States, General Secretary Gorbachev, Mrs. Gorbachev, welcome.

SPEECH BY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

Esteemed Mr. President,
Esteemed Mrs. Reagan,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Comrades,

Thank you very much, Mr. President, for the cordial welcome and kind words of greeting.

History has charged the governments of our countries, and the two of us, Mr. President, with a solemn duty to justify the hopes of Americans and Soviet people, and of people the world over, to undo the logic of the arms race by working together in good faith.

In the world's development, much will depend upon the choice that we are to make, upon what is to triumph: fears and prejudice, inherited from the Cold War and leading to confrontation, or common sense which calls for action to ensure the survival of civilization.

We in the Soviet Union have made our choice. We realize that we are divided not only by the oceans, but also by profound historical, ideological, socio-economic and cultural differences.

But the wisdom of politics today lies in not using those differences as a pretext for confrontation, enmity, and the arms race.

We are beginning our visit 46 years after the days when the United States entered the Second World War. And it was in those same days—in 1941—that the rout of Nazi forces began near Moscow. That is symbolic. Those days marked the beginning of our common path to victory over the forces of evil in a war which we fought as allies.

History is thus reminding us both of our opportunities, and of our responsibility.

Indeed, the very fact that we are about to sign a treaty eliminating Soviet and US intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear missiles, which are now going to be scrapped, shows that at crucial phases in history our two nations are capable of shouldering their high responsibility.

This will, of course, be the first step down the road leading to a nuclear-free world, whose construction you, Mr. President, and I discussed at Reykjavik. Yet it is a great step into the future—the future to which our two peoples and the peoples of all countries aspire.

I have come to Washington with the intention of advancing the next, and more important, goal of reaching agreement to reduce by half strategic offensive arms in the context of a firm guarantee of strategic stability.

We are also looking forward to a most serious and frank dialogue on other issues of Soviet-American relations.

Soviet foreign policy today is most intimately linked with perestroika, the domestic restructuring of Soviet society. The Soviet people have boldly taken the path of radical reforms and development in all spheres—economic, social, political, and intellectual.

Democratization and glasnost are the decisive prerequisites for the success of those reforms. They also provide the guarantee that we shall go a long way and that the course we are pursuing is irreversible. Such is the will of our people.

In charting these ambitious plans, the Soviet people have a vital stake in preserving and strengthening peace everywhere on Earth.

Mr. President, Ladies, and Gentlemen,

May I express the hope that the Soviet Union and the United States, working together with all nations, will take their place in the history of the outgoing 20th century not only as allies in the battle against Nazism but also as nations paving mankind's way to a safe world, free from the threat of nuclear annihilation.

On behalf of the Soviet people, I declare that we are prepared to go all the way down our part of the road with the sincerity and responsibility that befit a great and peaceful power.

Thank you.

THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

December 8, 1987

SPEECH BY RONALD REAGAN

Welcome to the White House.

This ceremony and the Treaty we're signing today are both excellent examples of the rewards of patience. It was over six years on November 18, 1981 that I first proposed what would come to be called the "zero option." It was a simple proposal, one might say disarmingly simple.

Unlike treaties in the past, it didn't simply codify the status quo or a new arms buildup. It didn't simply talk of controlling an arms race. For the first time in history the language of arms control was replaced by arms reduction. In this case the complete elimination of an entire class of US and Soviet nuclear missiles.

Of course this required a dramatic shift in thinking and it took conventional wisdom some time to catch up. Reaction, to say the least, was mixed. To some, the zero option was impossibly visionary and unrealistic, and to others merely a propaganda ploy. Well, with patience, determination and commitment, we've made this impossible vision a reality.

General Secretary Gorbachev, I'm sure you're familiar with Ivan Krylov's famous tale about the swan, the crawfish and the pike. It seems that once upon a time, these three were trying to move a wagon load together. They hitched and harnessed themselves to the wagon. It wasn't very heavy, but no matter how hard they worked, the wagon just wouldn't move. You see, the swan was flying upward, the crawfish kept crawling backward, and the pike kept making for the water. The end result was, they got nowhere, and the wagon is still there, to this day.

Well, strong and fundamental moral differences continue to exist between our nations. But today on this vital issue, at least, we have seen what can be accomplished when we pull together.

The numbers alone demonstrate the value of this agreement. On the Soviet side, over fifteen hundred deployed warheads will be removed and all ground-launched intermediate-range missiles, including the SS-20s, will be destroyed.

On our side, our entire complement of Pershing and ground-launched cruise missiles with some 400 deployed warheads will all be destroyed. Additional backup missiles on both sides will also be destroyed.

The importance of this Treaty transcends numbers. We have listened to the wisdom of an old Russian maxim, and I'm sure you're familiar with it.

Mr. General Secretary, though my pronunciation may give you difficulty, the maxim is "doveryai no proveryai," trust but verify.

Mikhail Gorbachev: "We keep repeating this each time we meet." (Laughter and applause.)

Ronald Reagan: "I like it."

This agreement contains the most stringent verification regime in history, including provisions for inspection teams actually residing in each other's territory, and several other forms of on-site inspection as well.

This Treaty protects the interests of America's friends and allies. It also embodies another important principle: the need for glasnost, a greater openness in military programs and forces.

We can only hope that this history-making agreement will not be an end in itself, but the beginning of a working relationship that will enable us to tackle the other issues, urgent issues before us: strategic offensive nuclear weapons, the balance of conventional forces in Europe, the destructive and tragic regional conflicts that beset so many parts of our globe, and respect for the human and natural rights that God has granted to all men.

To all here who have worked so hard to make this vision a reality, thank you and congratulations—above all, to Ambassadors Glitman and Obukhov.

To quote another Russian proverb, as you can see, I am becoming quite an expert in Russian proverbs, "The harvest comes more from sweat than from the dew."

I am going to propose to General Secretary Gorbachev that we issue one last instruction to you: get some well deserved rest.

Well, now, Mr. General Secretary, would you like to say a few words before we sign the Treaty? (Applause.)

SPEECH BY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

Mr. President,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Comrades,

Succeeding generations will hand down their verdict on the importance of the event which we are about to witness. But I will venture to say that what we are going to do—the signing of the first ever agreement eliminating nuclear weapons—has a universal significance for mankind both from the standpoint of world politics and from the standpoint of humanism.

For everyone, and, above all, for our two great powers, the Treaty whose text is on this table offers a big chance at last to get onto the road leading away from the threat of catastrophe. It is our duty to take full advantage of that chance and move together toward a nuclear-free world, which holds out for our children and grandchildren, and for the children of these grandchildren, the promise of a fulfilling and happy life without fear and without a senseless waste of resources on weapons of destruction.

We can be proud of planting this sapling, which may one day grow into a mighty tree of peace. But it is probably still too early to bestow laurels upon each other. As the great American poet and philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson said, the reward of a thing well done is to have done it.

So let us reward ourselves by getting down to business. We have covered a seven-year-long road replete with intense work and debate. One last step toward this table—and the Treaty will be signed.

Let December 8, 1987 become a date that will be inscribed in the history books. A date that will mark the watershed separating the era of a mounting risk of nuclear war from the era of a demilitarization of human life.

RONALD REAGAN AND MIKHAIL GORBACHEV ADDRESS THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN PEOPLES

December 8, 1987

SPEECH BY RONALD REAGAN

General Secretary Gorbachev and distinguished guests, my fellow Americans and citizens of the Soviet Union. The American philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson once wrote that there "is properly no history, only biography." He meant by this that it is not enough to talk about history as simply forces and factors. History is ultimately a record of human will, human spirit, human aspirations of Earth's men and women—each with the precious soul and free will that the Lord bestows.

Today, I, for the United States, and the General Secretary, for the Soviet Union, have signed the first agreement ever to eliminate an entire class of US and Soviet nuclear weapons. We have made history. And, yet, many so-called wise men once predicted that this agreement would be impossible to achieve, too many forces and factors stood against it. Well, still, we persevered. We kept at it. And I hope the General Secretary will forgive me if I reveal that in some of the bleakest times, when it did truly seem that an agreement would prove impossible, I bucked myself up with the words of a great Russian, Leo Tolstoy, who wrote, "The strongest of all warriors are those two, time and patience."

In the next few days, we will discuss further arms reductions and other issues. And again it will take time and patience to reach agreements. But as we begin these talks, let us remember that genuine international confidence and security are inconceivable without open societies with freedom of information, freedom of conscience, the right to publish, and the right to travel. So yes, we will address human rights and regional conflicts, for surely the salvation of all mankind lies only in making everything the concern of all.

With time, patience and will power, I believe we will resolve these issues. We must, if we're to achieve a true, secure and enduring peace. As different as our systems are, there is a great bond that draws the American and Soviet peoples together. It is the common dream of peace. More than 40

years ago, we fought in a great war as allies. On the day that news of the enemy's surrender reached Moscow, crowds gathered in front of the American Embassy. There they cheered the friendship of the nation that had opened a second front and sent food, munitions and trucks to the Soviet people as they displayed awesome courage and will in turning the invader back.

A young American diplomat later told of a Soviet soldier in the crowds who shouted over and over, "Now it is time to live." Too often in the decades since then, the soldier's dream, "A time to live," has been put off, at least as far as it concerned genuine peace between our two countries. Yet we Americans have never stopped praying for peace. In every part of the world, we want this to be a time to live.

Only those who don't know us believe that America is a materialistic land. But the true America is not supermarkets filled with meat, milk and goods of all description; it is not highways filled with cars. No, true America is a land of faith and family. You can find it in our churches, synagogues and mosques, in our homes and schools. As one of our great writers put it, America is a willingness of the heart, the universal human heart, for Americans come from every part of earth—including the Soviet Union. We want a peace that fulfills the dream of all peoples to raise their families in freedom and safety. And I believe that if both of our countries have courage and the patience, we will build such a peace.

In the next two months, people throughout the world will take part in two great festivals of faith—Hanukkah and Christmas. One is a celebration of freedom; the other of peace on earth, goodwill toward men. My great hope is that the biographies of our time will record that we had the will to make this the right season for this summit.

Thank you, and God bless you.

SPEECH BY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

I am addressing my fellow-countrymen, the citizens of the Soviet Union, and I am addressing the American people.

President Reagan and I have just signed a Treaty which for the first time in history envisages the most strictly verified destruction of two entire classes of nuclear arms.

The Treaty on the total elimination of Soviet and US intermediate- and shorter-range missiles will, I am sure, become a historic milestone in the chronicle of Man's eternal quest for a world without wars.

On this occasion, I would like to refer for a moment to history.

Not all Americans may know that at the height of a world war, the very first step taken by the Soviet Republic born in Russia in 1917, was to promulgate a Decree on Peace.

Its author, Vladimir Lenin, the founder of our state, said: we are willing to consider any proposals leading to peace on a just and solid basis.

This has been the cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy ever since.

We also remember another concept of his: disarmament, a world without arms, a world without violence is our ideal.

Today, regrettably, the risk of a nuclear catastrophe persists. It is still formidable. But we believe in mankind's ability to get rid of the threat of self-annihilation.

We are encouraged by the growing awareness in the world of the nature of the existing peril which has confronted mankind with the question of its very survival.

The sacred human right to live has now taken on a new, global dimension. And this is what must always be in the minds of, above all, political and state leaders invested with power by the will of their peoples.

The people is no abstract notion. It is made up of individuals and each one of them has the right to life and pursuit of happiness.

The Treaty just signed in Washington is a major watershed in international development. Its significance and implications go far beyond what has actually been agreed upon.

Our road toward this watershed was a difficult one. It involved lengthy and heated arguments and debate, the overcoming of accumulated emotions and ingrained stereotypes.

What has been accomplished is only a beginning. It is only the start to nuclear disarmament although, as we know, even the longest journey begins with a first step.

Moving ahead will require further intensive intellectual endeavor and honest effort, the abandonment of some concepts of security which seem indisputable today, and of all that fuels the arms race.

In November 1985, President Reagan and I declared in Geneva that nuclear war could never be won and should never be fought. We also declared that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States sought nuclear superiority.

This enabled us to take the first step up the platform of common search.

Geneva was followed by Reykjavik where a fundamental breakthrough was made in our perception of the process of nuclear disarmament. That is what made possible this Treaty and a substantive discussion of other issues pertaining to the nuclear confrontation.

We give credit to our American partners. Together we have been gaining experience that will help seek solutions to even more challenging problems of equal and universal security.

Most important of all is to translate into reality as soon as possible agreements on radical cuts in strategic offensive arms while preserving the ABM Treaty, on the elimination of chemical weapons and on reductions in conventional armaments.

The Soviet Union has put forward specific proposals on each of these problems. We believe that agreements on them are within reach.

We are hopeful that during next year's return visit of the US President to the Soviet Union, we will achieve a treaty on the elimination of practically one-half of all existing strategic nuclear weapons.

There is also a possibility of reaching an agreement on substantial cuts in conventional troops and arms in Europe, whose buildup and upgrading causes justified concern.

Once all this is accomplished, we shall be able to say, with confidence, that progress toward a secure world has become irreversible.

The elimination of weapons of mass destruction, disarmament for development—that is the principal, and, in fact, the sole effective way to resolve other problems that mankind is having to face, as the 20th century draws to a close. Among those are environmental problems, the problems connected with the implications of the new technological revolution, energy, mass poverty, hunger and diseases, huge foreign debts, and failure to balance the diverse interests and needs of scores of peoples and countries.

To cope with these problems, there will have to be, above all, fresh approaches to matters of national and universal security.

I know that with the signing of the Treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, some politicians and journalists are already speculating as to "who won." I reject this approach. It is a throwback to old thinking.

Common sense has won. True enough, it is not yet the greatest victory, but politically and psychologically it is very

important. It meets the aspirations and interests of hundreds of millions of people throughout the world.

People want to live in a world in which they would not be haunted by the fear of nuclear catastrophe.

People want to live in a world in which American and Soviet spacecraft would come together for docking and joint voyages, not for Star Wars.

People want to live in a world in which they would not have to spend millions of dollars a day on weapons that they could only use against themselves.

People want to live in a world in which everyone would enjoy the right to life, freedom and happiness, and, of course, other human rights which must be really guaranteed for any developed society to exist normally.

People want to live in a world in which the prosperity of a few is not achieved at the cost of the poverty and suffering of others. They want to have not only military, but economic security.

People want to live in a world which is democratic and free, with equality for all, and with every nation enjoying the right to its own social choice without outside interference.

People want to know the truth about each other, and to feel at long last the great universal kinship of nations, ethnic groups, languages and cultures.

Can such a world be built? We in the Soviet Union are convinced that it can. But this requires a most radical restructuring of international relations.

To move toward such a world, there has to be creative courage, new thinking, and a correct assessment of, and regard for, not only one's own economic capabilities and interests, but the interests of other nations as well. There has to be political will and a high sense of responsibility.

We in the Soviet Union have initiated a process of reassessing what has been achieved, and of developing a new program of action, and we are implementing it.

This is what we call perestroika. We have undertaken it without hesitation, for we realize that this is what our time demands. We have undertaken it because we want to elevate our society, speed up its development, make it even more democratic and open, and release all of its potential, so as to improve the life of our peoples materially and spiritually.

Our confidence in the future of our country and our conviction that a secure and civilized world can be built, are organically interrelated.

On behalf of the Soviet leadership and of our entire people I declare that in international affairs we are acting and will continue to act responsibly and seriously. We know what our interests are, but we seek to accommodate them to the interests of others, and we are ready to meet each other half way as equals.

The President and I have three days of intensive and important work ahead of us. Our talks are already under way. For our part, we will try to do all we can to achieve results, substantial results.

Thank you.

DINNER IN HONOR OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AT THE WHITE HOUSE

December 8, 1987

SPEECH BY RONALD REAGAN

Mr. General Secretary,
Mrs. Gorbachev,
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze,
Honored guests,

In our public statements and in our meetings together, Mr. General Secretary, we've always paid each other the compliment of candor. So let us continue to do so.

By now, Mr. General Secretary, you may have concluded that while we have fundamental disagreements about how human communities should govern themselves, it's possible all the same for us to work together. As we complete the first full day of this historic meeting, let us look back together at the developments of the past two years and the significance of what is taking place. For we find ourselves involved in a dramatic march of events that has captured the attention of our two peoples and the entire world.

Since you and I first met in Geneva in November, 1985, Mr. General Secretary, our two countries have moved toward a new period in the history of our relations. The highlight of your visit is the signing of the first US-Soviet arms control agreement in nearly a decade, the first ever to mandate actual reductions in our arsenals of nuclear weapons.

We're making significant progress in other important areas of arms reductions and have the opportunity, with mutual commitment and hard work, to achieve much more in the coming months. But our relationship, the United States and the Soviet Union, is not founded just on arms control, but reaches across a broad spectrum of issues, a relationship that addresses the basic problems of self-determination in the areas of regional conflicts and human rights. There are differences here, but ones that require frankness and candor. In bilateral matters, we also need hard and honest debate.

A century and a half ago, the brilliant French Tocqueville foresaw that our two countries would be the major countries of the world. History, geography, the blessings of resources and the hard work of our peoples have made it so. And between us, there has always been a profound competition of

political and economic philosophy, making us the protagonists in a drama with the greatest importance for the future of all mankind.

Man's most fundamental beliefs about the relationship of the citizen to the state and of Man to his creator lie at the core of the competition between our two countries. History has indeed endowed our relationship with a profound meaning. Certainly we will not settle those issues this week, but the tasks before us require a full awareness of those issues and of a responsibility that is binding on us both. I speak of a responsibility we dare not compromise or shirk. I speak of the responsibility to settle our differences in peace.

Already, by virtue of hard work and hard bargaining, we've accomplished much, and our negotiators deserve great credit. But we cannot afford to rest. There is more work to be done, and time and history are marching on.

So I offer a toast, a commitment on behalf of the American people of seriousness, goodwill, and hope for the future: General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev, to your health—"Za vashe zdorovie."

SPEECH BY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

Esteemed Mr. President,
Esteemed Mrs. Reagan,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Comrades,

Last summer it took one brave American by the name of Lynne Cox just two hours to swim from one of our countries to the other. We saw on television how sincerely friendly was the meeting between our people and Americans when she stepped onto the Soviet shore. She proved by her courage how closely to each other our peoples live.

It is, of course, true too that our systems are different and our ways of life are, too. We hold different views on many issues. And this will apparently continue to be so for a long time.

But without belittling great political and ideological distances, we are going to look for, and to find, ways of drawing closer together, where this is vital to us and to you, and to all humanity.

This is why we are here.

In a US television appearance on the eve of the year of 1986, I spoke about our hopes for a better future. By that

time, Mr. President, you and I had had two days of meetings in Geneva, one on one.

This enabled me in that New Year address to the Americans to say that one day there would come an end to the "winter of our discontent" (as a novel by John Steinbeck is called).

Today, after Reykjavik and extensive preparatory work which made our Washington meeting possible, we can say that the "winter" is waning.

Outside this house there spreads the vast world to which you and I are, if you like, accountable—to the peoples of our countries, to our allies, friends and all contemporaries.

The Russian word "perestroika" (restructuring) can be applied to the process, which has got under way all over the world, of taking a new look at the realities of the nuclear and space age. It is now clear apparently for everyone that the problems of the present-day world cannot be solved by taking old approaches.

We see the task today as building a nuclear-free world. The path to it is thorny and rocky, but it can still be covered with the help of new thinking. You can see that changes are called for in this field as well, changes in mentality and changes in practical action.

The great epoch of geographical discoveries was not limited to one caravelle and one continent. Our movement to a nuclear-free world cannot be limited to conquering just one or two islands called IRM and SRM.

I hope that we shall move ahead right away, aiming to reduce strategic offensive arms—the principal and decisive part of the nuclear armory—and subsequently eliminating them altogether.

Keeping count of time as we approach the 21st century, we are bound to remember that, to the extent of our abilities and possibilities, each of us embodies a connection between the momentary and the eternal.

"Although man is not eternal, what is humane is," wrote our celebrated poet Afanasy Fet.

In the name of eternal humanity we accomplished today a very significant act. And my first toast is to that.

It is dear to our peoples and that is why I congratulate the Soviet and American peoples whose will is expressed in this agreement.

I would like to stress that it is a result not only of our efforts, but also of those by the allies of our nations and by representatives of all countries and mass movements whose

efforts and help make them by right participants in this historic event.

It would be fair today to give their due to the efforts also of those who were directly involved in drafting the Treaty.

I wish sound health to you, Mr. President, and to Mrs. Reagan.

Happiness and well-being to all those present.

Peace and prosperity to the peoples of our countries.

LUNCHEON IN HONOR OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AT THE US DEPARTMENT OF STATE

December 9, 1987

SPEECH BY GEORGE SHULTZ

Mr. General Secretary, Mrs. Gorbachev, distinguished guests.

Benjamin Franklin, the father of American diplomacy, who exchanged correspondence with Catherine the Great—and for whom this room is named—would be fascinated to be with us today. For this is the first time the leader of the Soviet Union has visited the Department of State. Welcome.

Your visit here, Mr. General Secretary, and the prospect of a visit by President Reagan to Moscow, should cause us to think about guidelines for managing our relations. What should we both be keeping in mind?

First, ours is a relationship as important as it is unique. It is important because we each bear an immense burden of leadership in the world. It is unique because the nuclear era demands that we engage each other despite our profound differences. As you said in your book, Mr. General Secretary, "There is no getting away from each other."

Second, our relationship will continue to be a difficult one to manage. We have contrasting philosophies, political systems and national interests. Our basic values, systems and interests will persist, even as the necessity to work together increases.

Third, we must be realistic, avoiding extremes either of hostility or euphoria through the ups and downs of our relations. The best approach to dealing with one another is one Ben Franklin might have suggested: Be down-to-earth, pragmatic and businesslike in seeking to solve concrete problems.

Fourth, we must speak with clarity and candor to one another about our differences. That is why at this summit we have stressed the fundamental importance we attach to human rights, as set forth in the Universal Declaration and the Helsinki Final Act. As the European community heads of government stated December 5, "Respect for human rights and freedom is a prerequisite for confidence, understanding and cooperation." We have spoken with candor about re-

gional issues as well. You have not hesitated to speak your mind to us. And we have made some progress. As President Reagan has said, we owe each other the tribute of candor, and candor will help get results.

Fifth, we must look to the future without neglecting the lessons of the past. Too often we face the past and back into the future. In five to ten years, our world will be vastly different from the one we know today—and from the post-war world of the past forty years which has conditioned so much of our thinking. Franklin—and Lomonosov, his contemporary—were ready and eager for the future. So should we be. The material substances of daily life are being transformed. The speed of human transactions is accelerating. Scientific, economic and political matters are now global in dimension. And through all these changes runs the thread of knowledge: its discovery, its rapid transmission as information, and the education needed to use it.

This leads to a sixth point—the recognition that openness to ideas, information and contacts is the key to future success. The conceptual breakthroughs embodied in the INF Treaty's provisions for verification and on-site inspection are but one example of the powerful pull which openness is already exerting in a key area of our relations.

We must seek steady progress toward a more open, more predictable, more stable and constructive relationship. In this time of change, a complicated interplay of international relationships complicates the management of our bilateral affairs. But new patterns of interaction also offer new opportunities for cooperation and progress. Let us grasp those opportunities.

Mr. General Secretary, Mrs. Gorbachev, to your health, to the health of the President and Mrs. Reagan, and to the Soviet and American peoples.

SPEECH BY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

Esteemed Mr. Secretary of State and Mrs. Shultz,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Allow me to express the gratitude for the invitation to such an authoritative institution as the State Department of the United States of America. A great deal in international politics depends on those who work here. In any case, the event which we witnessed yesterday and in which we participated would not have taken place without their part.

The President of your country and I signed yesterday the

Treaty on the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons, or, to be more precise, two classes of nuclear weapons.

The world will be rid as a result of approximately 2,000 lethal warheads, altogether. This is not a very large number. But the importance of the Treaty goes far beyond the limits of its concrete content.

We assess it as the beginning of the implementation of the program for the construction of a world without nuclear arms, the program which I proposed on behalf of the Soviet leadership and Soviet people nearly two years ago, on January 15, 1986.

I have been asked more than once since then if I continue to believe that the program is realistic. I answer: yes, certainly. The signing of the Treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles shows that the road to this aim is far from easy, but it also shows that is the right road and that the aim is feasible.

The will of hundreds of millions of people operates in this direction. They come to realize that as the 20th century is running out, civilization has approached the divide between not so much systems and ideologies as common sense, the instinct of self-preservation of humankind, on the one hand, and irresponsibility, national egoism, prejudice, in a word, old thinking, on the other.

Humanity is coming to realize that it has fought enough wars, that wars should be banished forever.

Two world wars and the exhaustive Cold War along with "local wars" that have taken and continue to take millions of lives is too high a price to pay for adventurism, conceit, disregard for the interests and rights of others, unwillingness or inability to face the realities, to show consideration for the legitimate right of all peoples to make their own choice and have a place in the sun.

This means that the lofty ideals of humanists of all times—the ideals of peace, freedom, the awareness of the value of every human life—should be the basis of practical policy.

Each new step in world development, given sound and responsible approach to it, enables us to grasp problems more profoundly and equips us with additional opportunities for their solution.

It is essential not to miss these opportunities, to use them to the utmost for building a more secure world, rid of trappings and psychology of militarism, a more democratic world.

It won't be an overstatement to say that this step—I mean the Treaty signed—and the preparations for it were truly

instructive. They enriched our two countries and world politics with the recognition of the significance of difficult but simple truths. It will be appropriate to mention some of them.

First of all, in meeting each other halfway we came to appreciate still more the role and importance of Soviet-American relations in present-day international development, and at the same time, our great responsibility not only to our peoples but also to the world community.

Second, we have become aware how important the support our allies give our efforts is. Moreover, what a substantial reserve is contained in their ideas, advice, in their real and involved participation, in coordinating our actions with them.

Third, we have tested in practice how important is the understanding of one's intentions, proposals and plans by the allies of one's partners and, certainly, sympathy and solidarity, and even a simple wish of success from many, large and small, developing and non-aligned countries.

All this confirmed convincingly a simple but very important truth that peace today is not a monopoly of a state or a group of states, no matter how powerful. Peace is the concern and lot of many, and is more and more becoming the concern of all. And wherever many interact, reciprocity is indispensable and compromises cannot be avoided.

Peace from the positions of strength is intrinsically fragile, no matter what is said about it. By its very nature it is based on confrontation—covert or overt, on the constant danger of outbreaks, on the temptations to use force.

Over centuries humanity was compelled to put up with such a really lean peace. But we can tolerate this no longer.

Some people think that in drafting the Treaty the Soviet side conceded too much, while others think that it is the US side that made too many concessions.

I think that neither view is right. Each side conceded exactly as much as is necessary in order to balance their interests in the given specific area.

In creating the atmosphere of contacts, of direct communication, getting to know each other better, without which it would be more difficult to achieve the Treaty, we, and I hope you too, realized more profoundly that in order to ensure that we all remain different, live in our homes the way we choose and have the opportunity to hold disputes with each other and assert our views, we need more than anything to preserve peace.

A fundamentally new important step, if a modest one, was made yesterday toward a more equitable, more humane order in international relations. One would like to hope that the subsequent steps will not be long in coming. Besides that, it is easier to continue a good undertaking, relying on the experience of the work already carried out.

We are all now living through a period of transition from the knowledge as dogma to the knowledge as thinking. We have embarked on restoring peacemaking predestination of politics. It should not be any longer the continuation of war by other means, the way it happened in the 20th century after the ending of world wars.

As politics change, the predestination of diplomacy changes, too. It is called upon to seek out seeds of accord even in the sea of differences and to turn the possible into reality.

The diplomatic services of our two countries had to exert themselves much in recent years. And marking this truly historic event, the signing of the Treaty, moreover, while here, within these walls, one should pay tribute to the many who applied their minds, drive, patience, persistence, knowledge, a sense of duty to their people and the international community in order to make this Treaty possible. I would like above all to commend Comrade Eduard Shevardnadze and Mr. George Shultz.

I would like to say a kindly word also about diplomats working abroad. They were not merely conducting negotiations. In the capitals of their host countries they helped people realize what can be achieved and what cannot, what is promising and what is so far not feasible.

I liked the thought expressed in a recent article in an American newspaper that diplomacy is the first line of a country's defenses and the front line in the struggle for peace.

But foreign policy ceased to be the domain of professionals alone. The practice of accords and agreements deceiving peoples and dooming them to actions and sacrifices running counter to their vital interests becomes a thing of the past. Any falsity, any untruth becomes revealed one way or another.

In this characteristic feature of the present I see a guarantee of genuine democratization of inter-state relations. In a strong field of human attraction, attention and exacting demands on people authorized to represent their states in other countries, they should constantly account for their steps and explain them.

Beside that, they are at the sensitive point of contact of cultures and the degree to which peoples understand one another greatly depends on them. And this is extremely important now in politics, too.

The presence in this hall of outstanding representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union is not a mere

concession to protocol and etiquette. This is the evidence of the fact that a political course toward better mutual understanding between our countries has an authoritative support.

This support inspired us on the long and arduous road to the agreement on the beginning of real nuclear disarmament. But since we do not intend to halt at the start of the road, this support will be needed also tomorrow, when we continue joint work to eliminate the biggest and the most dangerous part of our nuclear arsenals.

In this connection I would like to mention such a reserve for the relations between our countries as contacts between scientists and workers in the field of culture. It is precisely they who largely shape national awareness and attitude to other nations. And precisely for this reason they find the common language quicker, creating the necessary background also for politics. The role of the intelligentsia of the two countries in relations between our peoples and states is large and important.

In the language of ordinary human communication, in Russian and in English, what we have achieved here means the revival of hope. Force is a variable and unstable category, while truth achieved by honest work is constant, for it is humane.

We are now closer to truth than we were yesterday.

My congratulations to you.

DINNER IN HONOR OF RONALD REAGAN AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY

December 9, 1987

SPEECH BY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

Esteemed Mr. President,
Esteemed Mrs. Reagan,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Comrades,

The second day of our talks is over. The talks are proceeding in a frank and businesslike atmosphere.

In the center of our attention are major problems both of Soviet-American relations and of world politics.

I have the impression that we have made progress on a number of serious issues, and this instills optimism. There are still areas, however, in which the divergences are great.

I ought to say, Mr. President, that I sense that what we are discussing here is so significant for the entire world that we are constantly aware of the world's keen attention and interest in what is happening here.

This is only natural. The decisions we reach, the results we attain may become crucial for the destinies of the world. This is the point at issue today. Such is the scope of our responsibility.

Ladies and gentlemen, without confidence in the future, without faith that one's children and grandchildren will enjoy life, the joy of everyday life fades. No benefits of modern civilization and no achievements of the scientific and technological revolution can make up for that.

Our great Russian poet Alexander Pushkin said: the joy of life is the best university.

We would like to be involved in the establishment of a "university" whose curriculum would not include such "subjects" as enmity between nations, suspicion and disrespect of other peoples, disregard for their interests, fear and coercion.

Such a "university" would teach us how to live together in the present-day complex and multifaceted world.

As for our idea of a nuclear-free future, it is, as we understand, in line with public opinion in America.

Back in 1945 at the time when the first atomic bomb was made, outstanding American scientists who had taken part in

its development came out against the production and use of this terrible weapon.

Of course, bombs and missiles are not capable of thinking, although people do equip them with an "electronic brain." This mechanism has no soul or conscience and, therefore, is more dangerous than any madman.

There is no issue—be it conventional arms, regional conflicts or human rights—on which it would be impossible today to reach understanding or make progress, if, naturally, the issue is approached honestly and seriously.

The world is interconnected and interdependent for many reasons, not just because a nuclear catastrophe would spare nobody. The risks arising due to the ever greater distance between the poles of wealth and poverty increase every year. Solving that problem is one of the huge tasks involved in protecting the contemporary world from annihilation.

Investments in disarmament and peace are the most reliable and promising use of capital.

Shortly before my trip here, I was shown a youth newspaper called *Bridge* which American children who had visited the Soviet Union this year began putting out. Together with Moscow schoolchildren they set up a camp of friendship near the ancient Russian town of Pereslavl Zalessky which is not far from Moscow.

Their activities there included computers, telecommunications, sports, music, the Russian and English languages, games and excursions—everything they are capable of. The American children are now writing about their impressions.

I am not sure that any of you have held this newspaper in your hands. But it deserves most serious attention. This is a significant phenomenon. This is a school of human contacts in which we adults should learn from our children.

The children are showing us how to get rid of prejudices and boring stereotypes.

It turns out that it is easy and natural to establish the most friendly and close relations, to trust the citizens of another country, and to work together to create something useful.

This is very ennobling and makes everyone involved more humane, simple and, I would say, smarter.

The history of relationships between our peoples and states includes various pages. Some of them are inspiring while others evoke bitter feelings. Much has been spoilt over the past forty years.

Nevertheless, it is my deep conviction that everything positive—and there are a lot of positive things—can be used to the benefit of both peoples. As far as the Soviet people are

concerned, they know how to appreciate both goodness and kind words.

We shall never forget the American sea convoys to Murmansk, the sacrifices for the common victory and, of course, the link-up on the Elbe.

We also remember the factories built in the first five-year-plan periods with the assistance of American engineers and workers, the joint work of scientists who have battled the serious ailments of the century, and the joint space flight.

Our confrontation and antagonism have causes which are evaluated in different ways. However, it is much more wise to have peace and cooperation than confrontation and unfriendliness.

Peace to the peoples of the United States of America and the Soviet Union! Peace to the peoples of the planet Earth!

I wish Mr. President and his wife and all guests of our home health and happiness.

Till we meet in Moscow.

SPEECH BY RONALD REAGAN

Mr. General Secretary,
Mrs. Gorbachev,
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze,
Ambassador and Mrs. Dubinin,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

We're coming to the end of the second full day of your visit to our land. It's been an eventful two days. But now that you've seen our nation's capital, Mr. General Secretary, I only wish that you could have a chance to meet the people who normally work and do business here. Unfortunately, they're all in Iowa and New Hampshire campaigning for my job.

As everyone in the United States knows, I have a weakness for anecdotes. So if I may, I'd like to begin with a story I was so moved by recently that I mentioned it in my address to the people of the Soviet Union.

It's an account of one of our diplomats—a young man then stationed in our embassy in Moscow during World War II. He was there when news of victory—VE-Day—reached that city. And he said Red Square erupted in a spontaneous demonstration of thankfulness and joy.

Our embassy's chancery was just across from the Kremlin, and many of the Americans stationed there in those days were still in uniform. When they walked outside to join in the

celebration the crowd spotted them, lifted them onto their shoulders, and carried them on to Red Square. But the young diplomat said he was even more moved by the words of one Red Army major standing near him in the crowd, words filled with new-found hope—"Now it's time to live," he said.

Well, Mr. General Secretary, we've accomplished much so far in this Summit—a path-breaking agreement that for the first time will eliminate an entire class of US and Soviet nuclear weapons. But I'm convinced that history will ultimately judge this Summit, and its participants—not on missile count—but on how far we move together to the fulfilment of that soldier's hopes.

We have prided ourselves, Mr. General Secretary, on our realism—that we've come to this Summit without illusions, with no attempts to gloss over the deep differences that divide us, differences that reach to the core of values upon which our political systems are based. But we said: Even so we can make progress. Even so, we can find areas of agreement and cooperation.

But perhaps in this Christmas season we should look at an even deeper and more enduring realism. It is a reality that precedes states and governments, that precedes and surpasses the temporary realities of ideology and politics. It is the reality that binds each of us as individual souls—the bond that united Soviets and Americans in exultation and thanksgiving on that day of peace 42 years ago.

General Secretary Gorbachev, you've declared that in your own country there is a need for greater glasnost—or openness—and the world watches expectantly and with great hopes to see this promise fulfilled. When talking of openness and promising truth, you've called on the deepest hungers of the human heart, hunger shared by all, whether they be Soviet or American, or the citizens of any nation on Earth. Thomas Jefferson, one of our nation's great founders and philosophers once said: "The God who gave us life, gave us liberty as well." He meant that we're born to freedom and that the need for liberty is as basic as the need for food. And he, as the great revolutionary he was, also knew that lasting peace would only come when individual souls have the freedom they crave.

What better time than in this Christmas and Hanukkah season, a season of spirit you recently spoke of, Mr. General Secretary, when you noted the millennium of Christianity in your land and spoke of the hopes of your people for a better life in a world of peace. These are hopes shared by the people of every nation, hopes for an end to war, hopes especially, in this season, for the right to worship according to the dictates of conscience.

There's an old Russian saying: "Every man is the blacksmith of his own happiness." And like all folksayings, it contains a profound understanding of the human condition. We can, with our free will, shape our future, we can make it what that Soviet soldier saw in his vision of a better world, a vision of peace and freedom. In memory of that day in Red Square, when Soviet citizens carried American soldiers on their shoulders, in memory of that day when the Red Army embraced a new world of hope, I raise my glass.

Mr. General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, thank you. And Ambassador and Mrs. Dubinin, thank you for your hospitality this evening. And for my last attempt at Russian, "za vashe zdorovye" (your health).

FAREWELL CEREMONY FOR MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AT THE WHITE HOUSE

December 10, 1987

SPEECH BY RONALD REAGAN

Mr. General Secretary,

These last few days have been exciting indeed for both of us, for our fellow countrymen who follow the course of our discussions. I'm pleased to report that upon the completion of our business that this summit has been a clear success.

Like the star on the top of the national Christmas tree which was lit the evening you arrived, Mr. General Secretary, this summit has lit the sky with hope for all people of good will. And as we leave it—leave, it is up to both sides to ensure that the luster does not wear off, and to follow through on our commitments as we move forward to the next steps in improving the relations between our countries and peoples.

I believe both the General Secretary and I can walk away from our meetings with a sense of accomplishment. We have proven that adversaries, even with the most basic philosophical differences, can talk candidly and respectfully with one another, and, with perseverance, find common ground. We did not hide from the weighty differences that separate us. Many of them, of course, remain.

One of my predecessors, President Franklin Roosevelt, once said: "History cannot be rewritten by wishful thinking." Our discussions in that spirit were straightforward and designed to open a thoughtful communication between our governments on the critical issues that confront us.

Our exchange on the subject of human rights underscored the priority we in the western democracies place on respect for fundamental freedoms. I'm pleased that during this summit we addressed this area of heartfelt importance and have ensured a continuing dialogue on human rights at the highest levels of our governments.

Our discussions on regional conflicts were no less to the point. These conflicts continue to take a heavy toll in lives and impose a heavy burden on East-West relations. The General Secretary and I expressed different points of view. We did so bluntly, and for that reason alone our talks have

been useful in this area. Moreover we agreed that it is necessary to search for real political solutions to these conflicts. But so far we cannot be satisfied with what has been achieved. We must now press ahead in the search for political solutions that advance the cause of peace and freedom for the people suffering in these wars. The door has been opened. And it will stay open to serious discussion of ending these regional conflicts.

And as far as open doors, Mr. Gorbachev and I both agree on the desirability of freer and more extensive personal contact and the breaking down of artificial barriers between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States. As I said in my welcoming remarks, the fact that our governments have disagreements should not prevent our peoples from being friends.

Of course, the greatest accomplishment of these three days was the signing of a Treaty to eliminate a whole class of US and Soviet nuclear weapons. Another one of my predecessors, a President I've admired since my youth, Calvin Coolidge, once said: "History is made only by action." Well it took enormous effort and almost superhuman tenacity on the part of negotiators on both sides, but the end product is a Treaty that does indeed make history.

It is in the interests of both our peoples. Yet I cannot help but believe that mankind is the biggest winner. At long last, we have begun the task of actually reducing these deadly weapons, rather than simply putting limits on their growth.

The INF Treaty, as proud of it as we are, should be viewed as a beginning, not an end. Further arms reduction is now possible. I'm pleased some progress has been made toward a strategic arms reduction treaty over the last three days.

Individual agreements will not, in and of themselves, result in sustained progress. We need a realistic understanding of each other's intentions and objectives, a process for dealing with differences in a practical and straightforward manner, and we need patience, creativity and persistence in achieving what we set out to do. As a result of this summit, the framework for building such a relationship has been strengthened.

I'm determined to use this framework. My goal, which I believe you share, Mr. General Secretary, is a more constructive relationship between our governments, long lasting, rather than transitory, improvements. Together, we can bring about a more secure and prosperous future for our peoples and a more peaceful world. Both of us are aware of the

difficult challenges and special responsibilities inherent in this task.

During World War Two, when so many young Russians served at the front, the poem "Wait For Me" became a prayer spoken on the lips of Russian families who dreamed one day of the happiness that their reunion would bring. The cause of world peace and world freedom is still waiting, Mr. General Secretary. It has waited long enough.

General Secretary Gorbachev, Mrs. Gorbachev, it is good that you came to America. Nancy and I are pleased to have welcomed you here. Your visit was short, yet I hope you'll take with you a better sense of the spirit and soul of the United States of America.

And when you get back to Moscow, please pass on to the Soviet people the best wishes of the American people for a peaceful and prosperous New Year.

Thank you, and God speed on your journey.

SPEECH BY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

Esteemed Mr. President,
Esteemed Mrs. Reagan,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

In these last hours before our departure for home, we note with satisfaction that the visit to Washington has, on the whole, justified our hopes. We have had three days of hard work, of businesslike and frank discussions on the pivotal problems of Soviet-American relations, and on important aspects of the current world situation.

A good deal has been accomplished. I would like to emphasize in particular an unprecedented step in the history of the nuclear age: the signing of a Treaty under which the two militarily and strategically greatest powers have assumed an obligation to actually scrap a portion of their nuclear weapons, thus, we hope, setting in motion the process of nuclear disarmament.

In our talks with President Ronald Reagan, some headway has been made on the central issue of that process—achieving substantial reductions in strategic offensive arms, which are the most potent weapons in the world. However, we still have a lot of work to do.

We have had a useful exchange of views which has clarified each other's positions concerning regional conflicts, the development of our bilateral ties, and human rights. On some of these aspects, it seems likely that we shall be able to arrive at specific solutions, satisfactory both to us and to other countries.

A useful result of the Washington talks is that we have been able to formulate a kind of agenda for joint efforts in the future. This puts the dialogue between our two-countries on a more predictable footing and is undoubtedly constructive.

While this visit has centered on our talks with the President of the United States, I have no intention of minimizing the importance of meetings with members of Congress, with other political leaders, public figures, members of the business and academic communities, cultural personalities, and media executives. Such contacts enable us to gain a better and more profound knowledge of each other and provide a wealth of opportunities for checking one's views, assessments, and even established stereotypes.

All this is important, both for policy-making, and for bringing peoples and countries closer together.

These meetings have confirmed the impression that there is a growing desire in American society for improved and more healthy Soviet-American relations. In short, what we have seen here is a movement matching the mood that has long been prevalent among Soviet people.

In bidding farewell to America I am looking forward to a new encounter with it, in the hope that I will then be able to see not only its capital, but also to meet face-to-face with its great people, to chat, and to have some lively exchanges with ordinary Americans.

I believe that what we have accomplished during the meeting and the discussions will, with time, help considerably improve the atmosphere in the world at large, and in America itself, in terms of a more correct and tolerant perception by it of my country, the Soviet Union.

Today, the Soviet Union and the United States are closer to the common goals of strengthening international security. But this goal has yet to be reached. There is still much work to be done, and we must get down to it without delay.

Mr. President, esteemed citizens of the United States! We are grateful for your hospitality and we wish success, wellbeing and peace to all Americans. Thank you.

THE GENERAL SECRETARY ADDRESSES A PRESS CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON

December 10, 1987

STATEMENT BY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

Ladies and gentlemen,

Comrades,

We can now regard the visit as being over. Our delegation is leaving for home today. We will have a brief stop-over in Berlin. We have agreed with the leaders of the Warsaw Treaty countries to meet in order to discuss the results of my visit to Washington and the negotiations that I've had with President Reagan and other political leaders of the United States of America.

I realize, and that is natural, that you are interested, first of all, in our opinion, our assessment of the results of this visit. And I feel that you want to know as much as possible about those results. So perhaps I will take more time than usual in my introductory remarks.

First of all, I'd like to say that this has been our third summit meeting in the last two and a half years. And this in itself, probably, says a great deal—first of all about the dynamic nature of the political dialogue between the US Administration and the leadership of the Soviet Union.

And, therefore, we can say that Geneva and Reykjavik were not in vain, nor were other steps taken by our side as well as by the US Administration.

Had the third meeting not led to definite results, there would be no grounds for regarding it as an important event.

And now I am completely justified in beginning my assessment of this visit by saying that it has indeed become a major event in world politics. We could even go so far as to say that from the standpoint of both Soviet-American relations and the world situation in general an important new phase has been entered.

Much took place during the negotiations. But I would like to find the right words so as to avoid extremes and successfully convey the character and atmosphere of the talks, and, of course, give a correct assessment of the political results.

What, then, are these results? What can we tell you about them today?

First, we can talk about a deepening political dialogue between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States of America. Today the President and I have issued a joint Soviet-American statement at the highest level. This fact alone bears witness to a certain dynamism in our political dialogue.

The importance of that document lies in the fact that it shows both the range and the content of the discussions that we had. In reading this document you will be able to gauge both the degree of mutual understanding and agreement on various questions. At the same time, you will also feel, I trust, that this document indicates that there are still serious differences remaining.

What do we assess on the positive side in that document?

Firstly, the President and I have noted that certain progress has been achieved of late in relations between the US and the USSR.

Secondly, once again, having looked back on the events of the last few years, we have agreed that what has been achieved so far is based on Geneva and Reykjavik. It was those events that made the steps aimed at improving strategic stability and lessening the danger of conflicts possible.

We have, and I want to draw your attention to this, forcefully reaffirmed the solemn declaration of Geneva. We deemed it necessary to do this once again at this meeting in Washington. We affirmed that nuclear war should never be unleashed and cannot be won, that we are fully determined to prevent any war between our countries, be it nuclear or conventional, and that we shall not seek to achieve military superiority.

This is something that we regard as an undertaking of unlimited duration by the two great nations before the entire world community.

Thirdly, emphasis has been put on the special responsibility of the Soviet Union and the United States for finding realistic ways to prevent military confrontation and building a safer world for mankind as it enters the third millennium.

Fourthly, while realistically assessing the fact that differences still exist, and that on some points those differences are very serious indeed, we do not regard them as insurmountable. On the contrary, they only urge us to engage in more active dialogue.

Summing up this **conceptual part** of our joint statement, I will say that it has been recognized at the highest level of our two states that they are now emerging from a long drawn-out period of confrontation and are prepared to leave it behind them.

You will probably agree that this is an important political result and an important political statement which the joint document contains. It is this that constitutes the essence of the transition to a new phase in Soviet-American relations.

Second, in the course of the visit, **work on the Treaty eliminating all intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in the world, which took many years to prepare, has been completed.** As you know, the President and I have signed that agreement.

I have already had occasion to speak about the significance of this first step on the road leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Now that this has been done, when our signatures have been affixed to that document on behalf of our two nations, we can speak about a major event, what I would call a history-making event, having occurred. We can speak of a great success having been achieved through joint constructive efforts.

That is probably what makes this document so significant. The percentages of the cuts don't really matter. What does matter is that we have entered a new phase in the process of real nuclear disarmament by agreeing to eliminate two classes of missiles.

I would say that this is our common success, the success of our two countries. But at the same time, it is a success for our allies who took part at all stages of this long marathon in the quest for compromise, the quest for new approaches and new solutions to these difficult problems. And I would also like to mention the participants in public movements whose actions induced politicians in our countries and political circles around the world to work to ensure that the search for solutions aimed at concluding a treaty on the elimination of nuclear missiles, of these two classes in particular, continues in spite of all the difficulties and obstacles. And difficulties and obstacles did exist. They were not invented but very real, and many of these problems were new and unique, especially insofar as verification was concerned.

Generally speaking, this treaty is the net result of joint efforts by all nations. So today we can sincerely congratulate each other on having taken the first step on the path toward a nuclear-free world. And that is our common victory.

Third, **our negotiations of the past few days focused on the problem of achieving a real and radical reduction in strategic offensive arms.** That problem took up the most time. And some of the questions relating to this part of our discussions were resolved even as the participants in the official farewell ceremony were already waiting for us on the South Lawn of the White House. And I think this is understandable because such a reduction in strategic armaments is, after all, the centerpiece of Soviet-American relations. It is a question of great concern to the entire world community. And you, as journalists, should know quite well how closely the world has been following the process of negotiations on this particular question.

The idea is to cut strategic offensive arms in half. This is a complex issue. Both sides came to the conclusion that on this road, too, we must make a serious breakthrough, drawing on the experience we accumulated in the preceding phase of negotiations, including the experience gained in preparing the Treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. This should be done without delay, while there is still a real opportunity to stop the arms race and the build-up of strategic potentials and begin eliminating them.

Now, what kind of a scope can we talk about now with regard to the agreement on these issues? Right after we met and exchanged views on this issue—and this topic became central to our discussions right from the outset—the President and I issued instructions for a group of Soviet and American experts to be set up. And this group was set up. It is headed on our side by Marshal Akhromeyev, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, and on the American side, by Ambassador Nitze.

Over these three days the group has been working round the clock. It was given the task of preparing an agreed draft of instructions for the Soviet and American delegations in Geneva, on whose basis the delegations are to elaborate a treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, which would also ensure compliance with the ABM Treaty and non-withdrawal from it for an agreed period of time, so that this treaty could be signed during the visit of the US President to Moscow in the first half of 1988.

As a result, we have achieved **significant progress**—and I am saying this after careful consideration—on this problem, which is the major one for the Soviet Union, the United States and all nations in general.

As is known, even before the meeting in Washington, agreement was reached on reducing the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the USA by 50 percent, limiting the number of strategic vehicles to 1,600 and of warheads to

6,000. Sublevels on heavy missiles, the rules for counting heavy bombers, etc. were also agreed upon.

Following the work done here in Washington, quite a lot that was new was added to those agreements.

At long last, we worked out the problem of limiting the deployment of long-range sea-launched cruise missiles carrying nuclear warheads. The American side has agreed to establish limits for such missiles over and above the 6,000-warhead level and to conduct a search for mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of those limitations.

On this score, we had a very interesting exchange of views. We took advantage of the achievements of our science and technology in the area of creating national means for verifying the presence of nuclear weapons on various naval ships—whether surface craft or submarines—without conducting any on-the-spot inspection on board the vessels themselves.

I don't know whether this was accepted, but we suggested that if we reached agreement on this we could share our achievements so that our partners could see for themselves that those national means helped to identify not only the presence, but also the yield of nuclear warheads. And this problem of verification had been the most difficult one blocking the resolution of the entire problem of sea-launched cruise missiles.

Incidentally, on the subject of scientific and technological achievements, I said to the President that it was very important to involve our scientists in such undertakings, because they can really give expert assessments and realistic recommendations. I suggested that we set up a Soviet-American commission of scientists who could put forward their views and recommendations to the US Administration and the leadership of the Soviet Union.

But let's go back to the results of the negotiations. The question of verification has been elaborated in detail. Previously it presented a big problem. Mutual understanding in this field is a consequence of the successful work done in preparing the INF Treaty.

Limits have been set: a total of **4,900 warheads** for ICBMs and SLBMs within the aggregate level of **6,000 warheads.** As you can see, that is a new point, and a substantial one at that.

The President and I, with due regard for the preparation of a treaty on strategic offensive arms, have instructed the delegations in Geneva to elaborate an agreement which would commit both the Soviet and American sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972—and that includes the research, development and, if necessary, testing which are permitted by the ABM Treaty—and not to withdraw from the Treaty for a specified period of time. That is what we inscribed in our joint statement.

We agreed that we would continue intensive discussion of the question of strategic stability.

It has also been defined that if the USSR and the United States fail to come to an agreement before the end of the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, each side will then have the right to determine its mode of action.

As you can see, **we have made significant progress on the problem of nuclear and space arms, which is the most important and complex one.**

But for us to be able to prepare a treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms within several months, there is a great deal of work ahead for our delegations in Geneva, and not just for them, but also for the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States.

Fourth, now that we have reached agreement on eliminating intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and are addressing the problems of reducing strategic offensive arms, the questions of **conventional arms and of chemical weapons** are becoming increasingly important.

It can be said that they have become very acute and have come to the forefront. We don't tend to dramatize the situation and we condemn all attempts to speculate on this issue. I would like to emphasize my last remark so that it sinks in. Perhaps, you ought to give it some thought.

There are some very real concerns as regards the questions of conventional arms. They are shared by both us and the West Europeans. Therefore, we're inclined to pay very serious attention to these types of arms right now. And we now have accumulated good experience through preparing the INF Treaty. Those present here may recall the ups and downs that we had to go through in the course of its preparation. I'm sure you remember the question of the French and British nuclear potentials, the question concerning shorter-range missiles, the missiles deployed in Asia, and so on.

And nonetheless, a readiness to meet each other half-way has brought us to a conclusion of the treaty. From here stems a simple conclusion: that is also the way we should act in questions pertaining to conventional arms—to address serious questions, to remove existing concerns. The West asserts, for example, that the Warsaw Treaty countries have a superiority, but the East says that NATO and the West Europeans have the edge over it.

And I must say that in a way both sides are right, because they're basing themselves on actual existing data. But these facts confirm one thing—that there are indeed asymmetry and imbalance which have taken shape as a result of specific historical features in the building of armed forces.

We believe it is necessary to begin by elaborating an agreement on a mandate for the conference presently under way in Vienna. We must sit down at the negotiating table and look for solutions to the problems at hand. Negotiations can be meaningful only if we can talk about a mutual and simultaneous reduction and the elimination of imbalances and asymmetries. With that approach, we could surely resolve all the issues.

Some declare, for instance, that the Warsaw Treaty states have an advantage in Central Europe, but those who speak of this, for some reason, are silent about the fact that NATO has a considerable superiority on the southern flank of Europe, next to our borders.

We believe it necessary to also discuss such questions as the creation of a corridor between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization with limited armaments, particularly as concerns those of an offensive nature.

We should also think about the principle of sufficiency, and, in general, thoroughly discuss the problem of comparing military doctrines from the standpoint of transforming them into purely defensive ones.

I must say that the American side treated our proposal seriously and displayed interest, and we have agreed to address this problem directly, in a concrete way, at the level of our military establishments and with the participation of scientists and experts.

In short, in the area of conventional arms and armed forces, I suggested to the President here in Washington that we give that issue a new political impetus, such as the one that was given in Reykjavik on the problems of nuclear disarmament when we saw that the Geneva negotiations on them had virtually reached a deadlock. And that was beneficial then, and now we have the first Treaty eliminating nuclear weapons.

We can take the same approach today to the problem of conventional arms. We believe that is exactly how we should act. We should sit down at the negotiating table and lay our cards out. We should cast aside all altercation. And that will surely show who is trying to be sly, and who is in earnest, because both Americans and West Europeans, and we, and allies, all of us are fully aware not only of what there is installed and stored, and how much, but also where. And I

think that it's good that both our Western partners and we know it. Knowledge is a great thing.

We should lay our cards on the table, exchange all of the relevant data, assess that data, identify the asymmetry in the arms and armed forces and embark upon a search for solutions. This is our approach.

As far as we are concerned, let me say right out that we are prepared to adjust ourselves to that task immediately, and we shall insist on that being done. That is the opinion of our allies too. So I am expressing our common view on this matter.

Moreover, we are prepared for most radical reductions. Here too, we are trying to be realists. Most likely, this is a process that will have to go through certain phases. You can't resolve everything just like that. But we have to start by sitting down at the negotiating table and beginning to eliminate asymmetry and imbalance in order to drastically lessen the confrontation. That would be a significant achievement. And that could be accomplished in the near future.

In other words, we must be very thorough when dealing with the concerns of either side over questions of conventional arms.

During our meetings, the President and I also talked about chemical weapons in the same spirit. It is obvious how important their elimination is. This question has long since been under consideration and its discussion has recently gained momentum thanks to the constructive cooperation of the sides.

I deemed it necessary both in my discussion with Mrs. Thatcher and here, in my talks with the US President, to note the contribution made by the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and some other West European countries to the solution of this problem. And let me say that this contribution stimulated us as well. The Soviet Union has acted in a constructive way, especially on questions of verification and elimination of the stockpiles of chemical weapons. And let me remind you once again that we have ceased production of chemical weapons.

There was also a positive statement issued by the United States. But recently the progress in elaborating the convention has clearly slowed down. We said this directly and frankly to the President and the other American participants in the negotiations. We believe that the process slowed down through the fault of the United States. We felt that the US side wanted to go astray from the objective agreed upon in Geneva—a universal and complete ban on chemical

weapons—and wanted to exclude binary types of chemical weapons. In the event the convention is signed, even if there are "holes" in it, the United States would like to limit the facilities subject to verification to state-owned ones.

And what does that mean? For the Soviet Union it means all of them, but for America and Western Europe—practically none. So, what kind of equitable approach is that? What kind of consideration for concerns? What kind of partnership?

The US Administration, all the West Europeans, every participant in the negotiations should understand that the Soviet Union is not looking for any unilateral advantages and is prepared to move along all directions in the process of disarmament, but at each stage there should be a balance and parity. We shall insist on this. If someone starts having doubts and believes that he is being outpaced, it will undermine the process of disarmament, inject nervousness, uncertainty and complicate the atmosphere of the negotiations.

The attention of the American side was drawn to this and we proposed that those imbalances be rectified and suggested that this viewpoint be registered in our joint statement. And although our talks on chemical weapons proceeded with difficulty, we did, at long last, manage to agree that the two sides would conduct more active and intensive talks on elaborating a convention. The President and I expressed our dedication to the solution of this extremely important question, and we have instructed our experts to continue active discussion on the question of the non-use and of the non-proliferation of chemical weapons as well.

And now, about one other problem that has always been extremely important, but now, after the signing of the INF Treaty and in connection with the scheduled progress on reducing strategic offensive arms, has become still more topical—the problem of halting nuclear tests. You know that we have begun negotiations with the United States on that question. We asked the President if, given the changed situation, it would not be very desirable (and this would be correctly understood and properly appreciated in our countries and throughout the world) if we took a fresh look at this process as well, at these negotiations, and their content. We said it would be desirable to reach agreement on lessening the yield of nuclear explosions and drastically reducing the number of nuclear tests in the nearest future. But that is the minimal step which must be taken as quickly as possible in order that further progress could be made without delay.

At the same time, in the present, new situation, taking into

account and respecting the demands of the world public, we consider it appropriate and possible to establish a mutual moratorium on nuclear tests while the talks are under way.

Unfortunately, so far we have not gotten a positive response from our partners on this very important question which is causing concern throughout the world. Now, if we've started to disarm, this means we must consider any question in that context, and think and act accordingly. That is why we are not losing hope that our very important invitation to the American Administration to introduce a mutual moratorium on nuclear tests while the talks are in progress will still be given serious thought, that it will be carefully weighed. Perhaps, the US Administration might wish to consult with the people. We are told that America is a democratic country. So why not consult with the people on this issue and, perhaps, positively respond to our proposal? We are not losing hope.

Now, what else would I like to say on the military aspects of the negotiations? I would like to point out that a major and extremely important breakthrough has been achieved in the area of verification. I would say that the INF Treaty establishes unprecedented standards of openness, of glasnost. The scope and depth of mutual verification and control are unprecedented.

We have confirmed in practice the position that we have set forth on numerous occasions: when it comes to verification of disarmament, we will be the firmest advocates of the strictest, most effective control possible. For if verification is only talked about while the arms race goes on under cover of such talk, then what is the point of verification? In short, we are in favor of any kind of verification, of the strictest verification, if that verification concerns disarmament and the elimination of armaments and as long as the principle of reciprocity is observed.

This is all the more important today when we are approaching solution of the problems connected with strategic offensive arms, when we have approached the problems of eliminating chemical weapons. Besides, we already have experience and we feel more confident.

We exchanged views with the President on a whole range of other questions as well: regional, humanitarian. The examination of regional problems was not easy. We came here with serious intentions, with proposals to really come to an understanding on the most acute problems. We drew attention to the need to consider our joint approach to the solution of regional conflicts proceeding from the following: we are now witnessing an unquestionable striving of the world com-

munity to solve the existing regional conflicts by political means. This is clearly seen in the attitudes of many political quarters and governments; in the actions of the world public.

That's the phenomenon we are now witnessing.

This gives the USSR and the United States—two countries upon which much depends—an opportunity to really do something for resolving these very acute problems of world politics.

I can't say that we have made much headway on this issue. Yet, I and members of our delegation have the feeling that the US Administration has started approaching regional problems somewhat more realistically. Indeed, new approaches are needed here. And most important, both we and the Americans and other countries should unconditionally recognize that all nations have the right to their own choice. That is the crucial point of departure.

Regional solutions cannot be divorced from the question of human rights, and humanitarian issues. What can be higher than the right to security, to life, to settling one's national affairs as one sees fit? What can be more favorable for democratic forms and processes than a country's reliable security?

In short, all these things are interconnected, and it is from these positions that we approach the situation in Afghanistan. We are for a settlement which would make it possible to put an end to the internal bloody conflict, eliminate the possibility of its reoccurring, and prevent in the process of reaching a political settlement the origination of such a situation that would have serious consequences for the interests of the world community.

We said clearly that we do not want, we do not strive for a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan. But the American side must state just as clearly that it is not striving for a pro-American regime there. In a free, non-aligned and neutral Afghanistan, a government must be established on the basis of reconciliation, on the basis of all political realities being taken into account, on the basis of cooperation and a coalition of various forces and their national reconciliation. And to promote this our two countries can do a lot.

We put the question of Afghanistan as follows: the political decision on the withdrawal of troops has been taken. We've named the time limit—12 months. It could be less. That is the fourth item and it is awaiting its solution under the aegis of the Cordovez Commission. Our position is that the beginning of the withdrawal of troops must at the same time become the beginning of the termination of assistance in arms

and money to the Dushmans. From the very first day this is declared, our troops will start withdrawing. They will not take part in military operations, except in self-defense. Hostilities will cease and a process of political settlement will begin. We shall facilitate this process as much as our influence allows. But the main effort should be made by the real forces within Afghanistan itself, by all the sides concerned.

It seems that all this could produce a genuine document facilitating the process of political settlement. We have agreed to continue our work in this direction.

We also discussed at the talks in Washington regional conflicts in Central America, the Middle East, Southern Africa, the situation in the Persian Gulf, and so on.

On bilateral Soviet-American relations. The Soviet position was the following: the USSR and the United States are world powers, possessing major economic, intellectual, and military potentials. Their weight in international affairs is immense. That determines their role, and that determines their responsibility.

The many years of confrontation and sharp rivalry have produced nothing but harm. We have already proved sufficiently that we can live without one another, without trading, without having any extensive scientific or cultural contacts, without any cooperation in the solution of global issues. But the question arises: do we need to prove this? Is this not reminiscent of the futile labors of Sisyphus? Shouldn't two great nations, two world powers actually ponder the situation which has arisen as a result of acute confrontation throughout almost all the post-war years? The time has come to think all this over, so I said to the President and his colleagues: does it not seem to you that politicians are lagging behind the moods of the peoples? We judge by the sentiments in our own country, and we judge by the sentiments of the American people, and feel they want changes for the better. And they are beginning to act on their own. They are establishing contacts, searching for various forms and means of these contacts, and displaying amazing ingenuity, from the children to the wisest people in our countries. Everybody understands that the time has come to turn the last page of confrontation and begin a new stage.

These are very powerful imperatives, I believe, and they should be reflected in the policies of our governments.

I assure you that the Soviet leadership has but one opinion. A firm decision has been taken about which I am speaking today—we are in favor of a definite improvement in

relations with the United States of America. Our peoples need it, the entire world needs it.

I reminded the President that the world already regarded the way in which our two countries have been developing their relations as something laughable and as something to be mocked. There have been many comments along this line, for example, that we approach every problem by galloping toward each other head-on, with our visors down. When we do that we really are on the wrong path and can go much too far unless we stop ourselves.

I feel that everything that went on at the talks and everything that was publicly said by me, the President and other political leaders these past few days confirms that, except for some narrow circles, there are no opponents to the sensible approach and understanding.

If these responsible political declarations are followed by responsible and real steps, then we can look forward to better times, to better years. I believe that not only our peoples, but the whole world will applaud this.

Also this last week, on the eve of my visit to Washington, I had some meetings with foreign statesmen—Kenneth Kaunda, a well-known political figure of Africa, and Prime Minister Hawke of Australia. They were very insistent in advising me, in asking me to tell the US President that both in the West and on all continents people are hoping for an improvement in international relations.

In my discussions with them I encouraged them to make their own contribution. And they responded that they were ready to make their contribution, but that it was most important for the USSR and the USA to come to terms with each other.

I feel that we must become aware of this and embody it in real politics. The time has come.

I assure you that our actions will proceed from such an understanding of the situation.

I said this to the President at the very first meeting we had, at meetings with leaders of Congress, representatives of the intellectual circles of America. And I said this in my meeting with the US media executives and representatives of the business community. I said this openly in all my speeches.

I hope that our voice will be heard. And it has been heard, I think, by the American people. People are even changing the way they treat one another on the street.

All of a sudden Americans have appeared in Washington's streets who are in good spirits. They wave their hands. At one point today when I was driving around with the Vice-

President we got out of the car and met with a group of Americans. And I could sense their mood. I told them that we are talking with the President about how to come closer to each other, how to improve our cooperation. So go ahead and prod the President toward that. Our Soviet people are solidly prodding us toward that goal. So I've not only been indulging in politics, but also I've been conducting propaganda. But I still think that the best propaganda is a real, progressive, and constructive policy.

In our bilateral questions, as soon as we began to think about how to come closer to each other, a great many problems came up for discussion which we could address, and you will see this in the joint statement. There are many concrete questions concerning the environment, the preservation of the ozone layer, a peaceful outer space, a flight to Mars, medicine, a thermonuclear reactor, trade, etc. This opens up possibilities for us to consider joint projects in concrete terms.

So these days were filled with serious discussions, exchanges of opinions and views. And I believe that the substance of this visit allows me to say that it was a significant dialogue and the results too are significant. I believe all this will bear fruit if we consistently move ahead step by step, however difficult it might be, and I'm sure that it will be very difficult. We will move ahead in the quest for mutual and acceptable solutions, taking into account each other's interests. A great impetus has been given to that process.

In conclusion, I deem it my duty once again to say a few sincere words about the feelings expressed by Americans on the eve of the visit and during the visit. Just before the press conference I met a group of young Americans and told them that young American and Soviet people seem to come to terms with one another much faster than we politicians. They have no complexes. Before we can come to terms, we have to get rid of the old stereotypes, of the obstacles standing in the way. And that's not all that easy at a ripe age. But the youngsters are open with each other and find a common language very quickly. And this is not a superficial, children's approach, it's not a matter of looking at things through rose-colored glasses. They are serious people. Between fifteen and seventeen years old, they are already giving serious thought not only to their personal problems, not only to what is of interest to themselves, but also to how we should live in this world. It's an amazing phenomenon and, by the way, it should be written about.

In my discussion with the media executives, I explained

why I give interviews so rarely although I like lively exchanges very much. After three, four or five interviews it becomes clear that the same questions are being asked. Then what are we going to talk about? Are we to talk for the sake of talking? To try and prove that we have not 4,000, not 2,000, not 500, but only 22 individuals who are imprisoned in our country for having broken the law, that there are only 220 persons who have been refused permission to leave because they worked with defense and computer technology, control systems, in short, with state secrets. No matter what you say, no matter what you write, no matter who shouts at us and from where, we will not let them go until these secrets are no longer secrets. This is what the world is like today, and we are forced to take this into account. But then everything in our relations is being reduced to this and interviews are being requested not to find out the truth, not to prompt each other to thought, but simply to expose a politician as quickly as possible, to drive him into a corner.

Is that a dialogue? Is that the purpose of interviews and is that what the media is for in general? People want to live better, people want to understand each other better, they want to communicate and be friends. And how much is being blown out of proportion through the press? And this is done supposedly because it will lead to more openness. I'm not trying to accuse you of something, to say that politicians are such great people and that such bad people are working in the media. No, I'm simply saying that the media too needs a perestroika and needs to master a new way of thinking. Do you agree with this?

Let's think about this together, because we're all in the same boat. Or is everything clear to you? If so, I envy you. But at the same time, if everything is already clear to you, I pity you. Please give thought to this.

Taking advantage of this opportunity, I want to return to the thoughts about the Americans' reaction, the feelings they expressed over these days. And I would like right now, as this visit is drawing to a close, to say thank you for the hospitality, the openheartedness, and cordiality. And they can be sure that this will be heard in the Soviet Union, by the Soviet people, and it will be met by the most sincere and lively response. I want them to hear these words. And upon our return home, we will share our impressions of our visit to this country.

The visit was limited to Washington. I would like to come to the US again, when circumstances permit, and communicate with the people. This I would truly like to do.

And I would like to wish the American people success and the realization of their hopes. I wish to assure Americans that, on the part of the Soviet people, they have a reliable partner in all that concerns peace, cooperation and common progress for all.

Thank you.

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After that Mikhail Gorbachev answered questions put by correspondents.

Question: In your book *Perestroika* and in your speeches, you've talked about a process of democratization in the Soviet Union. Now that you've had at least a fleeting encounter with the American concept of democracy, I wonder if you could tell us what you've learned and what differences you see between American ideas of democracy and your own ideas of democratization?

Answer: I have felt that there is a need, both in your country and in ours, to try and understand what values underlie American society and what values underlie ours.

This problem was a subject of serious dialogue and discussion both with the President in private meetings and in meetings attended by other parties, including a meeting with congressional leaders.

We have agreed: let us take all these issues—on democracy, on human rights, everything that lies in the humanitarian sphere—out of the plane of political speculations and bring them into the plane of realistic study of and acquaintance with the values that the American people have formed in following the road of their choice and the accomplishments of the Soviet people since they made their choice in 1917.

We agreed that this should be done at the level of the Supreme Soviet and US Congress by organizing workshops, seminars and meetings, holding thorough discussions and making assessments. We are prepared to present and characterize our situation and set forth our view of the situation in America. Similarly, the American side must say in a firm, substantive way what it believes must be said. In other words, we must take this seriously. I think we will find that to be beneficial.

Question: Mr. General Secretary, probably one of the most abnormal conditions in the relations between the US and the Soviet Union is the level of trade. Can you tell us: in this summit meeting, were you able to discuss this problem with President Reagan, or with other leaders on your visit

here? And could you give us your thoughts on the potential for economic cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union?

Answer: This is a very interesting question on a big subject. I think that if we have seriously made a decision to change our relations for the better, we cannot allow a weakening in dynamics in any direction. So far, little has actually been done to expand economic cooperation and trade.

One cannot hope to conduct a political dialogue successfully without restructuring economic ties, economic relations. I had discussions over the past three days with the President and with leaders of Congress—which has made its own "unique contribution" of adopting so many amendments that it will now require a huge bulldozer to remove them all. *(Laughter.)*

I asked them to review this situation. Today, I had a substantial conversation with businessmen, with major representatives of America's business community. One can say that there is an understanding of the need for change for the better in this important sphere. The final document contains a record on this account. It is directed at stimulating trade, economic relations and the implementation of major projects, including the undertaking of joint ventures.

I think that this political message will enable US business and business circles in the Soviet Union to step up cooperation. The possibilities for that, according to those who know the Soviet Union, are enormous.

An American representative said today that, in contrast to ties with China, he has noticed that there's a great purchasing capacity in the Soviet Union, and, accordingly, a tremendous stimulus for undertaking joint ventures.

But that is not competition. We both maintain ties with China, and we will be pleased if you continue developing them further. I think that our relations with the People's Republic of China, with our neighbor and friend, will continue developing.

Question: On several occasions during the past week your authorities roughed up non-violent, peaceful demonstrators outside the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Is that perestroika, is that glasnost?

Answer: Where laws are violated those whose duty it is to confirm that the state and the law exist go into action. Sometimes incidents occur, but only then when the law is violated. In this particular case everything happened as it

should, in accordance with the law, and the incident ended there.

Question: There were some hints from some of your colleagues before you arrived here that there could be some progress on offensive weapons without sticking strictly to the ABM Treaty, that there could be some compromise on strategic defense. It seems as though those issues are still linked. We're told by Administration officials that you insisted on that linkage during the talks. Do you see any way that between now and the President's visit to Moscow, a treaty on offense could be reached without first reaching agreement on defense? Or is that linkage permanent?

Answer: Our position was outlined in my opening remarks. We will work hard to make the President's visit to the Soviet Union culminate in the signing of that treaty. We shall be acting constructively on the basis of the principles which were agreed upon and published in the final document.

Question: You recently proposed a reduction of the military forces in the north, in particular naval forces. Somehow later this proposal was not mentioned again although it is part of NATO-Warsaw Pact relations. Is this proposal still alive? What is the fate of this proposal? Will it be included in further exchanges between East and West?

Answer: At a time when we have embarked on the road of nuclear disarmament and intend to tackle the problem of conventional armaments, it is important to make sure that as we are solving one set of questions we don't allow even bigger problems to pile up in other spheres. That is, as we start removing nuclear arms from Europe and Asia, on a global scale—I refer to the class of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles—there should not be any sudden "compensations" for the purposes of intensifying the military confrontation in other regions.

I think that would be wrong and that is why our proposal to scale down military activity in northern areas is constructive and proceeds from the general idea to reduce military confrontation. It remains in force.

Question: Diego Cordovez, the United Nations Mediator on Afghanistan you mentioned, has proposed to begin a new series of negotiations in January or February to help reach a political seetlement—an interim government in Afghanistan that would include the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the seven Mujaheddin factions, or, as you call them, Dushmans, and a group of Afghan elders, perhaps led by the former king. Do you support those efforts to create an interim government in Afghanistan, and if such an effort were

to succeed before summer of next year and the United States were willing to cut its arms supplies to the Mujaheddin factions at that time, would you begin troop withdrawals, that is next summer, from Afghanistan?

Answer: It seems to me that I have given a detailed explanation of our approach. But since the question has arisen, I'll tell you that if there is a meeting next January-February, we will welcome it. And, for our part, we are prepared to facilitate this. I believe that if these two questions are linked, as the rest already are—the question of the withdrawal of troops and the question of terminating the assistance in arms and money, then we could reach a positive result even in the coming month. We have agreed with the President to continue consultations and to study in greater detail the positions of the sides on this matter.

Question: What is the most promising field of political dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States in the immediate future?

Answer: Let's not indulge in guesswork. But at any rate I believe that we have created some assets during this meeting. And if we are consistent in our actions, if we display restraint, we can bring about serious changes in various areas, first and foremost disarmament.

Question: How much did your views and the American views coincide or differ on the issue of the Persian Gulf? In particular, how do you feel about being charged of jockeying for position and shielding Iran? And why is the Middle East international conference no longer of importance to you, or at least not a priority?

Answer: Let me start with your second question. I asked the President to give thought again to the US Administration's attitude toward the preparation and holding of an international conference on the Middle East because, as it seems to me, there is broad agreement in the world as to the expediency and possibility of holding it.

It seemed to me that the discussion of this subject would be continued because the preparations for the conference should not give the US Administration reason for concern. Bilateral, trilateral and regional meetings could be held within the framework of this process. So it appears to me that if the conference has such a format it will be possible to take into account the diversity of views many different governments express on this score. I think progress is possible here.

As for your first question, yes, we have been accused of wanting to look good and purposefully acting in a way that makes the Americans look bad. I disagree with these accusations. A side makes this or that impression depending on the way it acts and not on how its actions are characterized by somebody else. You can observe how we act and how the Americans and others act, and form an opinion of your own.

We believe that the great powers, the permanent members of the UN Security Council have a big responsibility to prevent a situation from arising in that region that would bring about a major conflagration. At all stages, even before the adoption of Resolution 598 and today as well, we have always said that it is necessary to act in such a way that the parties to the conflict would know what is expected of them and that they would be able to realize the impermissibility of aggravating the situation. We also feel that we have not yet exhausted that resolution's possibilities.

I will limit myself to this remark. We did have a more concrete discussion on this but have not yet completed it. We will continue it so as to fulfil the responsible role of the two countries at this very complex stage of the development of the situation in the Persian Gulf and in the Iran-Iraq conflict.

Question: If two or three years ago someone had tried to forecast the events of these past days, it might have been called political fantasy. Now it is becoming reality. I would like to ask you what is the objective basis underlying the current process, the current turn? And why is this turn happening now?

Answer: When we made our statement of January 15 and set forth our plan for a phase-by-phase elimination of nuclear arms and the easing of military confrontation in all spheres, many people said that it was illusory. Now life itself has shown that such forecasters were wrong.

When we arrived in Reykjavik, the place of a most dramatic meeting—incidentally, who of you present here were in Reykjavik? *(A lot of hands are raised.)* Good...

You will recall the atmosphere in which my press conference began. The expectations were not fulfilled and everything ended very dramatically. I saw journalists in the hall and sensed their mood. I saw that I was facing not just professional journalists, sharp-tongued media people, but people concerned about what was going on. And that mood was catching.

I remember that press conference. Today I can fully confirm what I said there—Reykjavik was a dramatic event, but at the same time it was an important breakthrough in coming to realize that, in the end, there is something that governs and determines the actions and behavior of poli-

ticians. A dramatic change has taken place in the sentiments of the world public in recent years—a change leading people to realize the irreversibility of many troubles that affect the whole of humanity. The activities of the intelligentsia of all countries brought this change about. They came to realize what was happening—physicists and mathematicians, doctors, people in the arts. And then they passed their apprehension and alarm on to all other sectors of the population. Without momentous changes in the minds of people in all countries we would have hardly seen the transformations that have made it possible to take the first major step in the sphere of real disarmament—the signing of this major, history-making document.

Question: We know you are planning a trip to Latin America soon. What is the purpose of that trip and what political initiatives can Latin Americans expect from the Soviet Union in the near future?

Answer: And you already know that I'm going there soon? *(Lively response in the hall.)* I have a strong desire to go to the countries of that continent where very serious, deep changes of historic scope are taking place. And I believe that the way things will be developing on that continent, if you add to that what is going on in Asia, will largely determine the course of world politics. This is why dynamic and momentous changes in Latin American countries, in my opinion, make any politician interested in knowing what the reality there is want to go there so as to make his own observations and come up with his own analysis that could be used in political activity. So that's the main motive. I think that the prospects for Latin America are big in terms of embarking on a broad path of development. But the difficulties facing it are also big.

Question: Do you think that you were able to change President Reagan's ideas about the Soviet Union in your meetings with him? Six or seven years ago he used to say that the Soviet Union was an "evil empire".

And the second part of the question. Have you changed any of your ideas about the United States based on these three days in Washington?

Answer: Well, I guess that Mr. Reagan's views have changed for the better, as have mine.

Question: It's nice to hear that you'll be flying to Berlin tonight. How do you assess the contribution made by the allies, the contribution made by the German Democratic Republic, to the treaty you have signed?

Answer: Not a single constructive move made over the past few years was made without the participation of the allies. We considered and discussed everything together. In all things we acted in perfect harmony, on a permanent basis, and this is why I want to say once again that we are grateful to our allies for the major contribution they made to this meeting, to this Treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. Well, the rest I'll say in Berlin.

Question: It appears that both you and President Reagan are of the opinion that in this three-day summit you have significantly altered the course of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. It would appear that in these three days the relationship between you, one to the other, was somehow altered. What changed, sir, and how did things change between you and the President?

Answer: I think that the agreements we have achieved in the past three days will be important for the development of relations between our countries. There is one condition: that we remain loyal to our commitments. I would like to assure the American people and the US Administration that we shall act in a responsible manner, proceeding from our agreements. I think we now have a better understanding between the President and myself. Our dialogue has become more business-like and our approaches have become more constructive. I'd even venture to say that we trust each other more.

Question: In today's remarks at the farewell ceremony at the White House, neither you, nor the President mentioned the forthcoming visit by Ronald Reagan to the Soviet Union. Will that visit take place, or does it depend on further progress in your relations?

Answer: It definitely will take place. The joint statement says so.

Question: Would you tell us to what extent the achievement of agreements in the field of disarmament might determine the success of perestroika?

Answer: The notion of a relationship between disarmament and development applies to perestroika as well.

Question: After signing the INF Treaty, what, in your view, is the significance of establishing a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe?

Answer: This subject is now acquiring greater urgency. I would call it a valuable initiative.

Question: Did you discuss during the talks in Washington

a definite time limit for non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the so-called interpretation of the Treaty? Was anything said by the Soviet or the American side on the SDI program?

Answer: I would put it like this: everything was discussed.

Question: You said that the Soviet Union was also working in the field of strategic defense...

Gorbachev: I did not say that.

Question continued: After your meetings with Ronald Reagan, what will you instruct your experts to do in this field? Will they speed up their work or slow it down?

Answer: I said that we were conducting basic research which, in some areas, covers problems that are designated in America as defense initiative. I did say that. But I also said that we are strong opponents of SDI. We will not develop it at home. We call on the US Administration to do likewise.

But if the US Administration does not heed our opinion, if it continues developing SDI, it will assume all the responsibility.

Strategic stability will be disrupted. The arms race will acquire new spheres which will have unpredictable consequences. If the Americans have a lot of money, let them waste it on SDI. We will look for a response along other, asymmetrical lines that will be at least a hundred times less expensive. This is what I said.

Question: In your recent address in Moscow, you said that the world and you would not agree to a summit which nothing came out of, except the signing of agreements already reached. Now, all that has happened, from what you tell us, is that the INF Treaty was signed. You were turned down on the disarmament corridor, you reached no agreement on the test ban, and I'm wondering if you are at all disappointed, and if you think maybe we should be?

Answer: I don't want to repeat my introductory remarks in which I gave a detailed assessment of the outcome of the visit. I have nothing to add.

Question: Are the two sides any closer on the question of how long you both agree to comply with the ABM Treaty? And do I understand it correctly that without such an agreement the Soviet Union will not go ahead with any deal on strategic missiles?

Answer: We issued instructions to our delegations, and they will continue the talks in Geneva. At the moment, I don't want to go into the specifics of those problems.

Question: You've always said that the most important thing is to stop the extension of the arms race into outer space. Has your meeting here this week made that any less likely?

Answer: I don't think so. I will say once again that preventing the extension of the arms race into outer space remains the goal of our policy.

JOINT SOVIET-US SUMMIT STATEMENT

Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Ronald W. Reagan, President of the United States of America, met in Washington on December 7-10, 1987.

Attending the meeting on the Soviet side were Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Alexander N. Yakovlev, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Vladimir M. Kamentsev, Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei F. Akhromeyev, Assistant to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoli S. Chernyayev, Head of the General Department of the CPSU Central Committee Valeri I. Boldin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Alexander A. Bessmertnykh, Ambassador of the USSR to the United States of America Yuri V. Dubinin, Member of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Victor P. Karpov, and Ambassador-at-Large Alexei A. Obukhov.

Attending on the US side were Vice President George Bush, Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci, Chief of Staff Howard H. Baker, Jr., Acting Assistant to the President Lieutenant-General Colin L. Powell, Counselor of the Department of State Ambassador Max M. Kampelman, Ambassador-at-Large and Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Paul H. Nitze, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Ambassador Edward L.Rowny, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., Ambassador of the US to the USSR Jack F. Matlock, and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Rozanne L. Ridgway.

During the course of the official visit, which had been agreed during the two leaders' November 1985 meeting in Geneva, the General Secretary and the President held comprehensive and detailed discussions on the full range of issues

December 7. The first minutes on American soil. US Secretary of State George Shultz greeting Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

December 8, morning. The welcoming ceremony for Mikhail Gorbachev at the White House.

A historic moment: General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan signing the Treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles.

In the streets of Washington during the visit.



At a talk in the White House.

December 9. Mikhail Gorbachev meets with leaders of US Congress.

December 8. President Ronald Reagan of the United States gives a dinner in honor of Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the White House.

December 10. Mikhail Gorbachev and US Vice President George Bush have a short talk at the Soviet Embassy.

Press conferences were given by experts from the Soviet Union at Washington's Marriot Hotel prior to Mikhail Gorbachev's visit.

Mikhail Gorbachev's press conference for journalists covering the Washington Summit.



December 10. The farewell ceremony for Mikhail Gorbachev at the White House.

between the two countries, including arms reductions, human rights and humanitarian issues, settlement of regional conflicts, and bilateral relations. The talks were candid and constructive, reflecting both the continuing differences between the two sides, and their understanding that these differences are not insurmountable obstacles to progress in areas of mutual interest. They reaffirmed their strong commitment to a vigorous dialogue encompassing the whole of the relationship.

The leaders reviewed progress to date in fulfilling the broad agenda they agreed at Geneva and advanced at Reykjavik. They took particular satisfaction in the conclusion over the last two years of important agreements in some areas of this agenda.

The General Secretary and the President affirmed the fundamental importance of their meetings in Geneva and Reykjavik, which laid the basis for concrete steps in a process intended to improve strategic stability and reduce the risk of conflict. They will continue to be guided by their solemn conviction that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. They are determined to prevent any war between the Soviet Union and the United States, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority.

The two leaders recognized the special responsibility of the Soviet Union and the United States to search for realistic ways to prevent confrontation and to promote a more sustainable and stable relationship between their countries. To this end, they agreed to intensify dialogue and to encourage emerging trends toward constructive cooperation in all areas of their relations. They are convinced that in so doing they will also contribute, with other nations, to the building of a safer world as humanity enters the third millennium.

I.

The two leaders signed the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. This Treaty is historic both for its objective—the complete elimination of an entire class of Soviet and US nuclear arms—and for the innovative character and scope of its verification provisions. This mutual accomplishment makes a vital contribution to greater stability.

The General Secretary and the President discussed the negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive arms. They

noted the considerable progress which has been made toward conclusion of a treaty implementing the principle of 50-percent reductions. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to work toward the completion of the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the treaty during the next meeting of leaders of state in the first half of 1988. Recognizing that areas of agreement and disagreement are recorded in detail in the joint draft treaty text, they agreed to instruct their negotiators to accelerate resolution of issues within the joint draft treaty text including early agreement on provisions for effective verification.

In so doing, the negotiators should build upon the agreements on 50-percent reductions achieved at Reykjavik as subsequently developed and now reflected in the agreed portions of the joint draft treaty text being developed in Geneva, including agreement on ceilings of no more than 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems, 6,000 warheads, 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles; the agreed rule of account for heavy bombers and their nuclear armament; and an agreement that as a result of the reductions the aggregate throw-weight of the Soviet Union's ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to a level approximately 50-percent below the existing level, and this level will not be exceeded by either side. Such an agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner.

As priority tasks, they should focus on the following issues:

(a) the additional steps necessary to ensure that the reductions enhance strategic stability. This will include a ceiling of 4,900 on the aggregate number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads within the 6,000 total;

(b) the counting rules governing the number of long-range, nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to be attributed to each type of heavy bomber. The delegations shall define concrete rules in this area;

(c) the counting rules with respect to existing ballistic missiles. The sides proceed from the assumption that existing types of ballistic missiles are deployed with the following numbers of warheads.

In the United States: Peacekeeper (MX):10, Minuteman III:3, Minuteman II:1, Trident I:8, Trident II:8, Poseidon: 10.

In the Soviet Union: SS-11:1, SS-13:1, SS-17:4, SS-18:10, SS-19:6, SS-24:10, SS-25:1, SS-N-6:1, SS-N-8:1, SS-N-17:1, SS-N-18:7, SS-N-20:10 and SS-N-23:4.

Procedures will be developed that enable verification of the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles of each specific type. In the event either side changes the number of warheads declared for a type of deployed ballistic missiles, the sides shall notify each other in advance. There shall also be agreement on how to account for warheads on future types of ballistic missiles covered by the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms;

(d) the sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range nuclear-armed SLCMs. Such limitations will not involve counting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs within the 6,000 warhead and 1,600 strategic offensive delivery system limits. The sides committed themselves to establish ceilings on such missiles, and to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods or verification of such limitations, which could include the employment of national technical means, cooperative measures and on-site inspection;

(e) building upon the provisions of the Treaty on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, the measures by which the provisions of the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms can be verified will, at a minimum, include:

1. Data exchanges, to include declarations by each side of the number and location of weapon systems limited by the treaty and of facilities at which such systems are located and appropriate notifications. These facilities will include locations and facilities for production and final assembly, storage, testing, and deployment of systems covered by this treaty. Such declarations will be exchanged between the sides before the treaty is signed and updated periodically after entry into force.

2. Baseline inspection to verify the accuracy of these declarations promptly after entry into force of the treaty.

3. On-site observation of the elimination of strategic systems necessary to achieve the agreed limits.

4. Continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production and support facilities to confirm the output of these facilities.

5. Short-notice on-site inspection of:

(I) declared location during the process of reducing to agreed limits;

(II) locations where systems covered by this treaty remain after achieving the agreed limits, and

(III) locations where such systems have been located (formerly declared facilities).

6. The right to implement, in accordance with agreed-upon procedures, short-notice inspections at locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring.

7. Provisions prohibiting the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by national technical means. Such provisions would include a ban on telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information broadcast during missile flight.

8. Measures designed to enhance observation of activities related to reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms by national technical means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party.

Taking into account the preparation of the treaty on strategic offensive arms, the leaders of the two countries also instructed their delegations in Geneva to work out an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time. Intensive discussions of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the specified period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of action. Such an agreement must have the same legal status as the treaty on strategic offensive arms, the ABM Treaty, and other similar, legally binding agreements. This agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner. Therefore, they direct their delegations to address these issues on a priority basis.

The sides shall discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the Soviet-US strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability, to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

The General Secretary and the President reviewed a broad range of other issues concerning arms limitation and reduction. The sides emphasized the importance of productive negotiations on security matters and advancing in the main areas of arms limitation and reduction through equitable, verifiable agreements that enhance security and stability.

The two leaders welcomed the opening on November 9, 1987, of full-scale, step-by-step negotiations, in accordance with the joint statement adopted in Washington on

September 17, 1987, by the Secretary of State of the United States and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR: The Soviet and US sides have agreed to begin before December 1, 1987, full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations which will be conducted in a single forum. In these negotiations, the sides, as the first step, will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the USSR-US Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976 and proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process. This process, among other things, would pursue, as the first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination. For the purpose of the elaboration of improved verification measures of the USSR-US treaties of 1974 and 1976 the sides intend to design and conduct joint verification experiments at each other's test sites. These verification measures will, to the extent appropriate, be used in further nuclear test limitation agreements which may subsequently be reached.

The leaders also welcomed the prompt agreement by the sides to exchange experts visits to each other's nuclear testing sites in January 1988 and to design and subsequently to conduct a joint verification experiment at each other's test site. The terms of reference for the experiment are set forth in the Statement issued on December 9, 1987, by the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union and the United States. The leaders noted the value of these agreements for developing more effective measures to verify compliance with the provisions of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

The General Secretary and the President reaffirmed the continued commitment of the Soviet Union and the United States to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and in particular to strengthening the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The two leaders expressed satisfaction at the adherence since their last meeting of additional parties to the Treaty and confirmed their intent to make, together with other states, additional efforts to achieve universal adherence to the Treaty.

The General Secretary and the President expressed support for international cooperation in nuclear safety and for efforts to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, under further-strengthened IAEA safeguards and appropriate export controls for nuclear materials, equipment and tech-

nology. The leaders agreed that bilateral consultations on non-proliferation were constructive and useful, and should continue.

The leaders welcomed the signing on September 15, 1987, in Washington of the agreement to establish nuclear risk reduction centers in their capitals. The agreement will be implemented promptly.

The leaders expressed their commitment to negotiation of a verifiable, comprehensive and effective international convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. They welcomed progress to date and reaffirmed the need for intensified negotiations towards conclusion of a truly global and verifiable convention encompassing all chemical weapons-capable states. The Soviet Union and the United States are in favor of greater openness and intensified confidence-building with respect to chemical weapons both on a bilateral and a multilateral basis. They agreed to continue periodic discussions by experts on the growing problem of chemical weapons proliferation and use.

The General Secretary and the President discussed the importance of the task of reducing the level of military confrontation in Europe in the area of armed forces and conventional armaments. The two leaders spoke in favor of early completion of the work in Vienna on the mandate for negotiations on this issue, so that substantive negotiations may be started at the earliest time with a view to elaborating concrete measures. They also noted that the implementation of the provisions of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is an important factor in strengthening mutual understanding and enhancing stability, and spoke in favor of continuing and consolidating this process. The General Secretary and the President agreed to instruct their appropriate representatives to intensify efforts to achieve solutions to outstanding issues.

They also discussed the Vienna (mutual and balanced force reduction) negotiations.

They expressed their determination, together with the other 33 participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to bring the Vienna CSCE follow-up conference to a successful conclusion, based on balanced progress in all principal areas of the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document.

II.

The leaders held a thorough and candid discussion of human rights and humanitarian questions and their place in the Soviet-US dialogue.

III.

The General Secretary and the President engaged in a wide-ranging, frank and businesslike discussion of regional questions, including Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, the Middle East, Kampuchea, Southern Africa, Central America and other issues. They acknowledged serious differences but agreed on the importance of their regular exchange of views. The two leaders noted the increasing importance of settling regional conflicts to reduce international tensions and to improve East-West relations. They agreed that the goal of the dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States on these issues should be to help the parties to regional conflicts find peaceful solutions that advance their independence, freedom and security. Both leaders emphasized the importance of enhancing the capacity of the United Nations and other international institutions to contribute to the resolution of regional conflicts.

IV.

The General Secretary and the President reviewed in detail the state of Soviet-US bilateral relations. They recognized the utility of further expanding and strengthening bilateral contacts, exchanges and cooperation.

Having reviewed the state of the ongoing Soviet-US negotiations on a number of specific bilateral issues, the two leaders called for intensified efforts by their representatives, aimed at reaching mutually advantageous agreements on: maritime shipping, fishing, marine search and rescue, radio navigational systems, the USSR-US maritime boundary in the Chukchee Sea, the Bering Sea, and the Arctic and Pacific Oceans, and cooperation in the field of transportation and other areas.

They noted with satisfaction the agreement on the expansion, within the framework of the Soviet-US air transport agreement, of direct air passenger service, including joint operation of the Moscow-New York route by Aeroflot and

Pan American airways, and on the renewal of the Soviet-US world ocean agreement.

The two leaders took note of progress in implementing the Soviet-US general exchanges agreement in the area of education, science, culture and sports, signed at their November 1985 Geneva meeting, and agreed to continue efforts to eliminate obstacles to further progress in these areas. They expressed satisfaction with the plans to celebrate jointly the 30th anniversary of the first exchanges agreement in January 1988.

The two leaders reaffirmed the importance of contacts and exchanges in broadening understanding between their peoples. They noted with particular satisfaction the progress made in the development of people-to-people contacts under the initiative they launched at their 1985 meeting in Geneva—a process which has involved tens of thousands of Soviet and US citizens over the past two years. The leaders reaffirmed their strong commitment to further expand such contacts, including among the young.

With reference to their November 1985 agreement in Geneva to cooperate in the preservation of the environment, the two leaders approved a bilateral initiative to pursue joint studies in global climate and environmental change through cooperation in areas of mutual concern, such as protection and conservation of stratospheric ozone, and through increased data exchanges pursuant to the Soviet-US environmental protection agreement and the Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes. In this context, a detailed study on the climate of the future will be elaborated. The two sides will continue to promote broad international and bilateral cooperation in the increasingly important area of global climate and environmental change.

The General Secretary and the President supported further cooperation among scientists of the Soviet Union, the United States and other countries in utilizing controlled thermonuclear fusion for peaceful purposes. They affirmed the intention of the USSR and the US to cooperate with the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and Japan, under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in the quadripartite conceptual design of a fusion test reactor.

The two leaders noted with satisfaction progress under the bilateral Agreement on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

toward establishing a permanent working group in the field of nuclear reactor safety, and expressed their readiness to develop further cooperation in this area.

The General Secretary and the President agreed to develop bilateral cooperation in combatting international narcotics trafficking. They agreed that appropriate initial consultations would be held for these purposes in early 1988.

They also agreed to build on recent contacts to develop more effective cooperation in ensuring the security of air and maritime transportation.

The two leaders exchanged views on means of encouraging expanded contacts and cooperation on issues relating to the Arctic. They expressed support for the development of bilateral and regional cooperation among the Arctic countries on these matters, including coordination of scientific research and protection of the region's environment.

The two leaders welcomed the conclusion of negotiations to institutionalize the COSPAS/SARSAT space-based global search and rescue system, operated jointly by the Soviet Union, the United States, France and Canada.

The two sides stated their strong support for the expansion of mutually beneficial trade and economic relations. They instructed their trade ministers to convene the USSR-US joint commercial commission in order to develop concrete proposals to achieve that objective, including within the framework of the Long-Term Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Facilitate Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation. They agreed that commercially viable joint ventures complying with the laws and regulations of both countries could play a role in the furhter development of commercial relations.

Both sides agreed on the importance of adequate, secure facilities for their respective diplomatic and consular establishments, and emphasized the need to approach problems relating to the functioning of Embassies and Consulates General constructively and on the basis of reciprocity.

V.

The General Secretary and the President agreed that official contacts at all levels should be further expanded and intensified, with the view of achieving practical and concrete results in all areas of the Soviet-US relationship.

General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev renewed the invitation he extended during the Geneva summit for President Ronald Reagan to visit the Soviet Union. The President accepted with pleasure. The visit will take place in the first half of 1988.



MIKHAIL GORBACHEV INTERVIEWED BY THE AMERICAN TELEVISION COMPANY NBC

Tom BROKAW, NBC correspondent: Mr. General Secretary, your trip to the United States is widely anticipated. As General Secretary, do you have a better feel for Americans now than you did when you were serving in other posts in this country?

Mikhail GORBACHEV: Well, you know, Mr. Brokaw, I'll respond to that question. But I would like first of all, right at the outset, to avail myself of this favorable opportunity through NBC to say a few words of sincere greetings to all the television viewers who are watching and listening to us and to all the American people. I would like to address them with words of sincere greetings from the Soviet people.

Before responding to your question, let me say that this year already I have received about eighty thousand letters from Americans, and that is a third of all the foreign mail that has been coming into the Central Committee of the Party. The letters cover a broad range of issues. There are letters from Congressmen, from businessmen; there've been a lot of letters from scientists and scholars, from people working in the field of culture and very many young people.

And, you know, a lot in those letters has stirred me, and, you know, many of the thoughts of those letters are similar; they revolve around several simple and yet very important questions and problems which obviously are of concern to the American people. In those letters I read that they are worried about the situation in the world, that there's a lot of tension, a lot of alarm, that regional conflicts are still ablaze, unabated. There is a lot of concern, and that, I guess, takes first place, a lot of concern about the state of Soviet-American relations.

And I felt in those letters and through those letters an immense desire of the American people, a very strong desire to change the situation in the world for the better and, of course, the pride of place is taken by the need for change in relations between us, between our peoples.

And these letters have given me a great deal and have helped me a great deal to understand the American people better. And this certainly adds to the immense political information I receive through other channels, through my contacts with American political figures at all levels, and of

course I do now have a better understanding, as I feel, of American society than I did before I took up this job.

But you know what the important thing is, and I'd like to tell you this: what the Americans say in their letters addressed to me and to the government of the Soviet Union, to our people, all this is very close to our hearts and very easily understood by all of us, by the Soviet people. And I see in this the emergence of a new situation and one which makes it possible, perhaps even makes it incumbent upon the politicians and the governments of our two vast nations to try and understand better the mood of our peoples and to give expression to the will of our peoples in our policies.

I shall leave other questions aside for the moment, but let me just address the topic of our relationship. I shall be going to Washington with a desire to discuss this problem as well, and I think it's a leading problem. How can we change relations between our peoples for the better? The Americans say in their letters: Why can't we be allies? We were allies at one time, why can't we be allies now? There are so many problems in the world. Can't we join our efforts, can't we pool the enormous might of our countries, the economic, intellectual capacities to resolve all these problems? And that is very important, very important indeed.

We need mutual understanding. And I believe that we must display greater respect for each other, try and understand the history of our nations better.

The Soviet Union is a unique phenomenon. It's a whole conglomeration of over a hundred nations and nationalities. And just try and imagine what is behind every one of those peoples and nationalities which now make up the Soviet Union. Next year the millennium of Christianity in Russia will be marked. But even before that Kievan Rus existed with a dynamically developing people, an original culture and wide ties with other nations. Or take the peoples of Transcaucasia, of Central Asia. Their history goes way back into the depths of history. A unique history, an original and significant history belongs to the peoples of the Baltic region. But all these nations now make up the Soviet Union. There is a lot in our history that was not simple. There was a lot of struggle. We had to fight back many invasions starting from Genghis Khan and Batu Khan and others in order to stand up for our independence. And, you know, that led to a forging of a national character and our values were thus formed. All of these peoples value their language, their culture, they are patriots, they have a feeling of dignity.

And without all that you cannot understand us or our actions if you don't know that history.

We are dedicated to peace, and you can travel far and wide throughout the Soviet Union anywhere and everywhere you will see and hear testimony of that. And that's why I say that we regard my visit next week as a very important phase in our relations. It will be our third meeting with President Reagan. And we'll be signing a treaty on medium-range and shorter-range missiles. We must address ourselves to strategic offensive arms, we will be discussing other world problems. So, on the whole, we will have a lot of things to talk about.

BROKAW: And we have a lot to talk about during the course of this hour, Mr. General Secretary. Can we begin with some of those now? For example, there is anticipation about your visit to the United States and I think there is general excitement about the signing of the intermediate-range nuclear treaty. But there is apprehension on the part of a lot of people that it will leave the Soviets in a superior position in Europe. Are you prepared now to reduce the number of men, tanks and attack helicopters that you have in Europe?

GORBACHEV: Well, firstly, the Americans and the Europeans and the others should know that the Soviet Union has no intention whatsoever of attacking anybody. That's number one. Second. There are realities which have taken shape within the framework of the two opposing military blocs. There is a certain asymmetry both in forces and armaments. We are prepared to address ourselves to that without delay. We've made our proposals and we are awaiting a more active position, a more active response from NATO. And therefore we are prepared to deal in practical terms, we are ready to sit down at the negotiating table and tackle these problems in practice.

BROKAW: Well, I think that NATO and the United States especially would be encouraged if you unilaterally would rearrange your forces into a more defensive position rather than an offensive position.

GORBACHEV: We have made known the content of our military doctrine, it is a defensive one. And let me repeat, we are ready to sit down at the negotiating table and, just as we dealt with the medium-range and shorter-range missiles, to tackle the question of conventional forces and conventional arms. We will be acting in a constructive way.

BROKAW: What are the chances do you think that by next summer you and President Reagan can sign a treaty to reduce by half, 50 percent, the long-range nuclear missiles, the really dangerous missiles?

GORBACHEV: Well, I believe that in this matter, which really constitutes the very core of Soviet-American relations, there are real prospects ahead of us.

I believe it is hard perhaps at this very moment to foresee how our talks will go and what results we will achieve as a result of an exchange of views on this matter during the forthcoming visit in my talks with President Reagan. But in any event, we certainly have a lot to discuss.

And I would repeat what I've said previously. We believe that it is possible to do a lot of work with the present Administration, yes, with this Administration, to make headway on this major direction in the area of nuclear disarmament.

We will act constructively, and I guess the Americans and the world at large have seen with their own eyes that we can act thus and that we are indeed acting constructively.

BROKAW: Your chief arms negotiator said the other day that he thought there could be a fifty-percent reduction in the ICBMs and that SDI and "Star Wars" would be a matter for the American people to decide. Has SDI been slightly diminished in your judgement as a condition for the reduction of ICBMs?

GORBACHEV: I believe that the question of SDI is not a subject for negotiations; we shall be talking about the strategic offensive arms, about levels and sublevels. And here we have some steps that we could take to meet the American position halfway, in fact, some of these steps we've already taken. We shall be talking about the strict compliance with the ABM Treaty. That's what we are going to talk about.

BROKAW: Am I clear in understanding that you believe that you can reduce ICBMs, the long-range missiles by 50 percent next summer and that you would deal with SDI separately?

GORBACHEV: We formulate our position in a very clearcut way. We are prepared to accept a fifty-percent reduction at the first stage with strict observance of the ABM Treaty. In whatever way SDI does not run counter to the ABM Treaty, let America act, let America indulge in research—insofar as SDI does not run counter to the ABM Treaty.

BROKAW: Isn't the easiest way, Mr. General Secretary, to deal with "Star Wars" or SDI, isn't the easiest way to eliminate the need for SDI just to eliminate the threat, to negotiate a great reduction in these long-range missiles first and then you wouldn't have the political or technical need for something like SDI?

GORBACHEV: Well, that is precisely what I suggested to President Reagan in Reykjavik.

And we were just about two paces away from signing an agreement on that score, but SDI came and stood between us.

If we reduce our medium-range missiles and shorter-range missiles and if we agree at the first stage to make fifty-percent cuts in our strategic offensive arms and then to go on and fully eliminate nuclear weapons, then the question arises: What is SDI for and what is the militarization of outer space for? You know, this is an attempt, yet another illusion of the American defense planners through, as they think, some kind of technological superiority, through the superiority, as they see it, in computers, somehow through outer space to forge ahead, to achieve superiority.

But look, tell me Mr. Brokaw, if you and I were to start trying to count how many attempts there were after the war on both sides to try and forge ahead, to gain superiority we would see that nothing came of it. We're simply wasting the funds of our nations, and we are creating a very acute situation in the world.

95 percent of all nuclear weapons or maybe even more belong to the Soviet Union and the United States. So, what must we do now, take weapons into outer space? That would certainly lead to a destabilization with unforeseeable consequences.

Just think how much time it took to find criteria for comparing the present nuclear capabilities of the sides. This is a very complex question, how to compare them, how to assess those potentials, and yet we found, over the decades, we found a way to do that.

But if we go into outer space with our weapons, if we start having an arms race in space, what will be the criteria there? There'll be a fever: who will beat whom? What is more, what if one side sees that it's being overtaken? What then? That's my first question.

And then, secondly, placing all your stakes on technology, which simply overrules the possibility of taking timely political decisions, is a very dangerous game.

And then look, if our peoples express a certain wish, why should we orient ourselves on the will or the desires of just one limited group or perhaps one segment in this or that country? That is not democratic, surely. You cannot impose the minority's will on the majority. Democracy is after all the rule of the majority.

BROKAW: But the President feels strongly that he has made a commitment and I am not prepared here, obviously,

to negotiate "Star Wars" on behalf of the United States. I would just like the record to show, however, Mr. General Secretary, that there are a great many people in the United States who believe that the Soviets as well are involved in efforts to militarize space and to develop their own SDI program. And, well, I don't believe that we can resolve that here today. I think that we ought to move on to new thinking, which is a subject we've been reading a great deal about in the Soviet Union; in your book *Perestroika* you say that new thinking means that security can no longer be assured by military means. What better way to demonstrate that than by getting the Soviet troops out of Afghanistan? Can you tell us tonight when are you prepared to do that?

GORBACHEV: Well, before I respond to that question, let me just react to your remark that the Soviet Union is engaged in things similar to SDI.

Well, it's really hard to say what the Soviet Union is not doing; the Soviet Union is practically doing everything that the United States is doing.

I'd say we are engaged in research, basic research, which relates to these aspects which are covered by SDI in the United States. But we will not build an SDI, we will not deploy SDI, and we call on the United States to act similarly. If the Americans fail to heed this call, we will find a response that will be ten or a hundred times cheaper, but then the guilt, the blame will be with the Americans, with the US Administration.

BROKAW: But that's the whole point. SDI cannot be deployed probably until the next century. There have already been cutbacks. Wouldn't the thing to do in order to send a signal to the American people be to reduce the long-range missiles in the meantime? There have already been delays and questions raised in the United States about the wisdom of the Strategic Defence Initiative. It seems to me that you could move along much more rapidly by agreeing to reduce long-range missiles in the meantime. And then you would still have time to respond, if you needed to.

GORBACHEV: Yes, provided that the ABM Treaty is intact. Now, on Afghanistan. This is our neighbor country. Under all the regimes, we were always good neighbors. It is a state which was one of the first to recognize Soviet power in Russia. There were kings and other rulers. They had their own processes under way, but whatever happened there, we were always friends. And in fact, that's the way we try to build our relations with all of our neighbors.

After the well-known revolution in Afghanistan, an at-

tempt was made to make some internal reforms and to bring that society out of its ancient system. A new government was established there. But that was a purely domestic process.

At the same time certain processes were building up connected first and foremost with interference from outside designed to undermine that new regime.

And the Afghans appealed to us as neighbors—some say 11 times, others say 13 times. They appealed to us for help in that very difficult period. And at one of these very acute moments, when the situation really became very exacerbated, we met the request of the Afghan Government and introduced our limited troop contingent, which does not run counter to the United Nations Charter.

But we see that today the situation requires a solution. We are looking for ways to bring about a prompt solution to that problem. And I believe that if the US Administration really does sincerely want that problem to be resolved, to be closed by political means, it could be done very quickly.

BROKAW: What is very quickly: within 3 months, 6 months?

GORBACHEV: I think we can talk with the President about that.

BROKAW: Will that be high on your agenda in Washington next week—the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and a guarantee that the government there will not be a threat to the Soviet Union?

GORBACHEV: Well, I guess we will talk about regional conflicts in Central America, in Southern Africa, in the Middle East, in the Persian Gulf and in Afghanistan.

BROKAW: Are you prepared to support Cuba and Nicaragua at the same level that you have been in the past, Mr. General Secretary?

GORBACHEV: Well, we must not only support and maintain the relations we have with those states, we must develop and improve those relations. But I think you meant something quite different when you asked that question.

BROKAW: More arms, more advisers to Cuba and to Nicaragua?

GORBACHEV: Well, I think that there's more talk about that in order to keep up the tensions in that area and to have excuses for intervention. I have to smile when I hear that the security of the United States is being threatened by the Sandinista regime. That's not serious. The country has been turned into the backyard of America, where the people couldn't live the way they did. They couldn't stand the dictatorship any more. And they rose up against it.

And we feel that those who supported that just indignation of a people which took power into its own hands are morally right. Why shouldn't that suit the Administration of the United States? I think now even in Congress they have understood that, to say nothing of the fact that many Americans have realized that Nicaragua cannot pose a threat to the United States.

BROKAW: But under new thinking, as you have defined it, wouldn't it be time to reduce the military assistance to places like Nicaragua and Cuba and let those regimes begin to stand on their own?

GORBACHEV: Well, since you keep talking about the new thinking, let me teach you a little lesson. I'm sure you won't have any complaints about what I'm going to say.

BROKAW: You are the teacher of the new thinking...

GORBACHEV: (Laughs.) I think that the situation in the world is such that it differs fundamentally from what it was 30 or 40 years ago, not to mention, say, 50 or 70 years ago. The empires are gone, they are no more. Dozens of nations emerged and are now developing independently. And all of them want not only political independence and autonomy, they want to live a better life, they want to live as human beings. They need food, they need clothing, they need medicines.

And now just try to imagine two and a half billion people in Asia, Africa and Latin America who dispose of vast natural resources, vast manpower resources, and yet they are in debt, they have a very low standard of living. So the question arises. Can this situation be left without attention? No, it calls for a solution.

Or take ecology. Is it not a common, global problem? Or the struggle against disease? Isn't that a common problem? What about mastering the scientific and technological revolution? Can we resolve all the problems involved without cooperation? Isn't that a common, global problem?

If the Soviet Union has interests, if the United States has interests, I guess other countries and peoples have interests, too. If previously international relations were built upon the right of the strong, according to the motto "might is right", that won't work today. However strong we might be, we cannot dictate our values or impose our way of life upon others, impose our social choice on others. It is up to them to decide. Unless we recognize the right to choose and recognize the interests of every nation, nothing will come of international relations.

And those relations are fraught with serious explosions. A

new thinking presupposes respect for the choice of every nation. We not only respect that choice. We try morally, and where we believe it necessary, economically, militarily and defensively, to support that choice, so that the people can defend what they have taken into their own hands. This is where you have to get to the bottom of the situation. You have to change your approach. You cannot order the world around, you have to change your approach.

BROKAW: You know how important symbols are in politics, Mr. General Secretary. There is no uglier symbol in the world than the division between East and West, than the Berlin Wall. Why won't you use your considerable influence with the East Germans just to have them take it down? What purpose does it serve anymore?

GORBACHEV: You know, I think that's a question that has already been exhausted. That is the sovereign right of a sovereign state, the German Democratic Republic, to defend and protect its choice and not to allow any interference in its domestic affairs. Through West Berlin much was done that caused great harm, both political and economic, to that country, to that people. So, these are all the realities which arose out of concrete situations.

I can say to you what I once said to a West German. He said to me: "Now, Mr. Gorbachev, Stalin used to say that Hitlers come and go, but the German people, the German state remains. But you have divided Germany into two states." I told him: "All right, let's remember the facts of history." And I reminded him of those facts; he; it turned out, knew them all. The division of Germany ran counter to the decisions reached in Yalta and Potsdam. So, that Wall appeared before you think it did. It's another matter that it was made out of a different material. But the result of what happened is what we have just now, those are the realities and we have to treat them as such.

BROKAW: Well, I don't think we can get all the way over the Wall here this evening, but maybe we can do something about human rights. How can you persuade the world that there is new thinking and a new sensitivity on the part of the Soviet Union if you simply do not let the people who live in this country come and go as they please, without risking their citizenship?

GORBACHEV: Mr. Brokaw, you will not be offended if I'm forthright and say that I assume that I have a very educated man sitting across the table in front of me and a very well-informed one. But when we come to a very important topic you take only a speculative aspect.

I'm ready to talk about human rights with any representative of the United States, with you too, if you are ready. And I can show you how things go in terms of human rights in this country and in your country, and in other parts of the world. We are in favor of rights, in favor of the broad rights of citizens. We are so dedicated to this, that it was, in fact, the purpose of our revolution. Do you know what we did during the revolution? We took power away from the landowners and gave it to the people. We took away the factories, the plants and private property, and gave them to the working people, and on that basis we eliminated exploitation of man by man. We built up a planned economy, we guaranteed each individual the right to work. And look, for how many years, for 50-odd years we have no unemployment. There's free education, guaranteed by the state, free medical care, guaranteed by the state, by society. The state has largely taken upon itself care for the provision of homes for the working people.

Why is this interesting? The national income in our country is lower, on a per capita basis as well, than in the United States, but in terms of social guarantees our society is much better than yours. When were your born?

BROKAW: I was born in 1940, Mr. General Secretary, but I know that you know what I am talking about...

GORBACHEV: Just a moment, we'll come to that.

In 1944 Franklin Delano Roosevelt introduced his bill on social and economic rights believing that there cannot be any real rights unless these problems are resolved. That was a very interesting bill. But it has remained in Congressional archives.

Taking into account that America is criticized throughout the world for not recognizing social and economic rights, that it is not signing or ratifying international covenants relating to that subject, this last July Mr. Reagan introduced once again another version of that bill on social and economic rights, although it was different from the one that Roosevelt had. And yet I think that a lot of water will flow down the Mississippi and the Volga before the US Congress and the Administration recognize the American people's right to economic and social protection. But all that has been guaranteed in the Soviet Union.

As regards the question that you've touched upon—exit and entry—you know, I understand the concern of the American side to some extent since it's your nation that was formed as a result of immigration. And therefore our views are different. But you know, in the United States or in Canada, they really don't want to allow people in from

Mexico or from other countries. Those who don't have the skills. In the 1970s when there was an especially big flow of those who wanted to emigrate from the Soviet Union there was a highly placed representative of the Administration who declared that the US resolved its problem of mathematicians by 50 per cent at the Soviet Union's expense. Thus the United States wants, through these channels, while making out that it is a champion of human rights, to resolve its own problems by organizing a brain-drain. And of course we are protecting ourselves. That's number one. Then, secondly, we will never allow people to be lured out of our country.

BROKAW: There are many cases...

GORBACHEV: All these cases will with time become more and more clear. All the individual cases we consider very thoroughly, and this is well known by the Congress, by the President. And we'll continue in a humane spirit to resolve every individual case, but within the framework of our laws. You should not, as we say, try to go into another man's monastery with your own charter. We have our democratic state based on a Constitution and our laws. As for goodwill, we have it. Family reunification, we believe that it is a problem. And we shall do our best to have this problem resolved. There are other problems connected with emigration and we shall always consider them with attention. But let us not inject any political speculations into this problem.

BROKAW: What do you think, Mr. General Secretary, do you think that the law moves too slowly in this country? What about those 4 thousand Soviet Jews whose visas have been delayed for a long time? Some of them are now cancer victims who want to leave the Soviet Union so that they could be with their families in their closing days. What do you think about them, just man to man?

GORBACHEV: I think that right now we have only those who have not been given permission to leave because of state security reasons. There are no other reasons. And we will continue to act in that way.

BROKAW: Mr. General Secretary, I'd like to ask you something about perestroika and the reorganization of your economy. There's no greater need in the Soviet Union than in reorganizing how you produce food in this country. This great power has to import food. Two per cent of your small farms produce a huge proportion of agricultural output. Are you going to greatly expand the private holdings of farm land and put them more on the incentive basis?

GORBACHEV: This question is one that was posed by President Reagan. I guess perhaps he may have asked you to

ask me that question, too. The wording was precisely the same.

BROKAW: No, this information is widely available in America to Presidents and humble reporters alike.

GORBACHEV: Well, let me say this. The food problem is one that does exist in this country, yet we eat 3,400 calories per person per day. The question is thus one of the structure of the diet. Now as to how much the individual small holdings produce. Those approximately two percent of the individual households produce up to one-third of certain agricultural products. But they could not have done this if they did not get their grain, livestock, technical assistance, fertilizers, expert consultations, transport services, seeds from the collective and state farms. They are really integrated with the collective and state farms. There is the practice of contracts. They sign contracts, a collective farm, let's say, and an individual holding. Usually they are members of a state farm or a collective farm. And they participate in the process of increasing agricultural production.

BROKAW: Are you going to expand that?

GORBACHEV: In all of this there is one very interesting side, one very interesting aspect. We are right now, on a long-term basis, suggesting that families and groups of people take a plot of land or hire some implements or machinery and show what their initiative is worth. And we have been able to combine the possibilities of the large-scale farms and the individual interests of these small groups. Now, that is an area where we will lend further support. And already this is yielding good results.

But this does not mean that we're abolishing the collective farm system. No, this is a flexible combination of the possibilities of large-scale farms which assume a great deal, and the initiative and the personal and material interests of a family or of a small group of persons that want to grow a certain crop or to produce meat and dairy products. We'll promote it in every possible way.

BROKAW: Are you going to allow individual enterprises to set prices? Are you going to allow unemployment to rise in this country? Are you going to run the risk of a recession and inflation as part of perestroika? That would be a fundamental overturning of the Soviet way of having an economy.

GORBACHEV: No, we will resolve this within the framework of socialism and by our own methods. It is in the West that the structural policy and modernization are accompanied by growing unemployment. We want to avoid this, and this will be done in that very way. Such opportunities are inherent

in a planned economy. Already now we are elaborating our plans for organizing new jobs in new territories and in other areas, especially in the area of services and trade. And thus on a planned basis and with due assistance from the state we'll transfer people from one sphere to another and retrain them. And I believe that this will be done in such a way as not to affect the incomes of the working people. In other words, this adaptation of the economy to scientific and technological progress will be achieved within the framework of socialist approaches, so as not to allow any unemployment. That is our pivotal task.

BROKAW: And no other party besides the Communist Party in the foreseeable future for the Soviet Union?

GORBACHEV: I see no need for any other party, and that is the view of our society. And today's changes which are taking place, the deep-going changes embracing the economy, politics, the sphere of democracy, the spiritual sphere, the social sphere—all this is taking place on the initiative of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

We have built up a new atmosphere in the country, an atmosphere of glasnost, openness, and we have plans to move forward the process of democratization and glasnost. All this is being done on the initiative of the Communist Party. The Party has drawn upon its own self the fire of criticism. This is democracy at work.

BROKAW: Well, let me bring you to that point. In your book you say the truth is the main thing. You quote Lenin as saying there should be more light, and yet when one of your colleagues in the Central Committee, Boris Yeltsin, who was the Party chief of Moscow, spoke in favor of faster reforms, his speech was not even published. And yet when he was fired it was done in a very public fashion. To some American observers it had the echo of Stalinism. Was that a mistake?

GORBACHEV: No, there was no mistake. You know, we will follow the path of perestroika firmly and consistently, we will follow the path of democracy and reforms firmly and consistently. But we will not jump over stages. We will not allow any adventurism. We have studied well the experience of all other countries in that respect, and our own experience, too. But we will not allow conservatism to be rampant either. And we shall wage our struggle without allowing adventurism, and at the same time resolutely combatting conservatism. We shall be very thorough, very careful. There is a huge country behind us, a great people. We cannot allow playing with politics. As to what happened to Boris Yeltsin, well, look, in fact it's a normal process for any democracy. I don't

want to count how many ministers or secretaries were replaced even recently in the United States, under President Reagan's Administration...

BROKAW: Yes, but when they are replaced they get to speak out about why they were replaced. We get to hear from them.

GORBACHEV: Well, you know, by the way, Comrade Yeltsin spoke twice at the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee and addressed the Plenary Meeting of the City Party Committee. His speech at the City Party Committee was published verbatim. Yeltsin himself posed the question of his being relieved from his post. So please, trust us to resolve such questions. I'm sure there will be other problems in perestroika. They'll have to be resolved. We will continue our political line aimed at perestroika, we will be insistent in pursuing that line.

BROKAW: We have only a few moments left, and I'd like to know more about Mikhail Gorbachev, the man. Recently there was much talk in the Soviet Union about a possibility for women to return to a purely womanly mission. What does that mean? Do you think women should be spending more time at home in the traditional role of mother and housemaker?

GORBACHEV: No, I think that a woman should take part in all spheres of life, in all of the processes taking place in society. But this must be done in such a way that one should not interfere with the other and we should think about how to help our women combine active participation in social and cultural processes with their predestination, that of keeper of the homefires, the family guardian, for a strong family means a strong society. So, we will not restrict the participation of women in public affairs. We will rather help women so that it is easier for them to combine the functions of motherhood, the role of the mother and the role of an active citizen of the country.

BROKAW: We have all noticed the conspicuous presence of Mrs. Gorbachev in your travels. Do you go home in the evening and discuss with her questions of public life and so on?

GORBACHEV: We discuss everything.

BROKAW: I accept your answer. Where do you learn about the United States? Do you read American newspapers, do you watch television programs, do you have special people who tell you about what is happening in the United States? How do you satisfy your own curiosity about our country?

GORBACHEV: I have access to a lot of information, not

only on the basis of the press, but also through other channels. We have many translations of political and Sovietological literature from the United States as well as American fiction. So, in this country anyone who is interested in the United States has a great many possibilities to get to know America.

BROKAW: Have you read any American books?

GORBACHEV: Well, I have to say that of course in my reading first place belongs to Russian and Soviet literature. But American literature certainly enjoys great popularity in this country. If we were to start trying to compare the number of translations, the number of authors that are translated and read in this country, the figures would be enormous. Mostly I've read American classics, but I know some of very important modern writers. Only let the Americans not consider their achievements to be the ultimate truth in all spheres of human thought. And then they will find amongst us many people who'd like to exchange views and discuss a lot of problems with them.

BROKAW: Do you follow the 1988 Presidential campaign in America and if you do, who do you think will win next fall? That's a question all the Americans ask themselves.

GORBACHEV: You know, we proceed from the assumption that we will be working constructively with any Administration regardless of party affiliation—whether Republican or Democratic, or another party perhaps. We will cooperate provided there is the appropriate desire and effort on the other side. As for the election campaign, well, I just want to say that even after the campaign we will be prepared to actively cooperate with whomever becomes the successor to the present President. As for forecasts about who will win and who will become the next President I think that's an irresponsible exercise. The Americans will come to the conclusion of who they need best and they'll do it themselves.

BROKAW: Finally, Mr. General Secretary, very briefly: how would you like to be remembered by Americans ten years from now, about the Gorbachev era?

GORBACHEV: Well, I don't want that in ten years' time everything should be relegated to memory. I think by that time there will only be a real upsurge in what we have begun to develop today. So I hope and believe that this will not simply be something belonging to the old past, it'll be part of the dynamic present. And it is for the sake of that goal that together with my colleagues, together with our working people that I am today, we are, all of us, working. I think that today we are sowing some good seeds, and they will give a

good yield, good results. If that were not so, it would be senseless to do what we are trying to do now, and doing it with enthusiasm, intensively, with a great desire to change everything for the better in the interests of socialism, in the interests of the Soviet people. And I believe that what is now happening in this country will be a certain contribution to the progress of human civilization.

BROKAW: Mr. General Secretary, thank you very much for this time.

GORBACHEV: And once again, let me avail myself of this opportunity to say to my American viewers: "Until we meet on American soil."

Pravda, December 2, 1987

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV MEETS WITH AMERICAN ARTISTS, INTELLECTUALS AND SCIENTISTS AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY

December 8, 1987

I'm sincerely glad to have this meeting, and I cordially welcome you in this hall. I appreciate the fact that, as busy as you are, you have responded to our invitation and have put aside other business for a while in order to meet with us here.

If we have made progress toward one another in our hearts, that means a lot. So thank you very much for the emotional effort on your part.

I mentioned in my NBC interview that I had received 80,000 letters from Americans. That doesn't count those that have arrived here at this Embassy. By the way, I get between 70,000 and 120,000 letters a month from my own fellow countrymen. So that's a lot of mail.

This is what Emily Holders, age 17, writes:

"Many Americans mistrust the Russians. Many Russians mistrust the Americans. We have many reasons for not trusting them, and they, the Russians, have many reasons for not trusting us. But I feel there's something wrong about all this, there's something missing."

The gathering was attended by American community leaders, people prominent in science, culture and the arts, who have for many years influenced politics and public opinion. Mikhail Gorbachev had already met some of them, in particular, at the Moscow forum For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity.

Among the visitors to the Soviet Embassy were Thomas Gittins, President of Sister City International; George Kennan, former US Ambassador to the Soviet Union; Gene LaRocque, head of Defense Information Center; Patricia Montandon, President of Children as Peacemakers; John Randolph, President of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship; James William Fulbright, former head of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the United States; Susan Eisenhower, grand-daughter of the late President Dwight D. Eisenhower, prominent in the peace movement; Robert M. Adams, President of the Smithsonian Institution; John Kenneth Galbraith, notable economist; Professor Bernard Lown, American co-chairman of the movement International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War; Carl Sagan, the astrophysicist; Marshall D. Shulman, Professor of Columbia University; Sidney Drell, Director of the Strategic Research Center, Stanford University; the singer John Denver; film stars Robert de Niro and Paul Newman, the singer and community leader Yoko Ono, and other celebrities.

This is the question posed by someone who is just 17 years old. And then the letter continues:

"We must have a sense of common responsibility for our survival. Therefore, what we must do is to try and build a world of responsibility as if our entire lives depended upon it. And if we, one human family, do not learn to cooperate as one humankind, then we will inevitably be destroyed by what we ourselves have created. But if we do learn to cooperate, just think of the wonderful future that will open up before us."

This is a budding philosopher who has some very good, optimistic views. So I think the young people who will replace us are a good generation. In another letter addressed both to myself and President Reagan the following question is raised, "Mr. President, Mr. General Secretary, you've lived your lives. And you are going to meet and discuss questions on which human lives depend. Please see to it that we can live our own lives too, and preserve the future."

Now I feel something very serious is happening, something very profound, something that embraces broad sectors of the population both in the United States and in the Soviet Union—an awareness that we cannot leave our relations as they are, relations between our peoples, between our two nations. And it occurred to me that any time this kind of ferment takes place in the minds of people, it begins with the intellectuals—with intellectual ferment. They are the yeast of society, as it were—it is they who trigger off new processes in society.

At the same time I have a question which I ask myself and you: aren't we, the representatives of political and intellectual circles, lagging behind what the people have already come to realize?

We should really ponder about whether we might not be lagging behind the sentiments and feelings of our peoples; those sentiments are clearly in favor of the two countries and peoples drawing closer together.

Academician Velikhov has shown initiative and organized an exchange for schoolchildren. A group of American kids spent their summer vacation in the Soviet Union in a place not far from Moscow—Pereslavl-Zalessky. They wrote some marvellous letters and had them recorded on tape.

Back in the United States, they put out a newsletter. One of its headlines was, "The Russians Are Coming." *(Laughter.)* And then they explained what kind of Russian "invasion" they were talking about and what the consequences would be.

I'm really thrilled by the fact that our kids—12, 13, 14 years old—the oldest were just 17—are so deeply aware that something needs to be done. And they certainly lay big demands on us.

I feel that we have approached a crucial point in history when we, especially politicians, have come to bear a special responsibility, that of expressing in full the sentiment of the people in favor of rapprochement between our two countries, in favor of an improvement in relations.

At the Moscow forum, and at a meeting with a group of prominent Americans, including Mr. Vance, Dr. Kissinger, Mrs. Kirkpatrick, Mr. Peterson and others, we talked about the fact that a confident, realistic policy is not possible nowadays unless politicians, scientists and artistic people join their efforts.

There are many former ministers, secretaries and ambassadors present here. It was only later that they realized it is possible to uphold the interests of one's own country only if the interests of others are also taken into account. Only if there is a balance of interests.

The Soviet Union has its own interests, and the United States has its own interests. And so do India, Kampuchea, and Bangladesh... Every country has its own interests. And I think it is important that precisely this understanding underlie the building of new relationships.

What I want to say is this. We are all children of our time, but there are new realities, and they have dictated new imperatives—what we call the challenge of the time.

The experience we have acquired is our wealth—if we dispose of that wealth properly, if we don't just lump it all together but rather draw lessons and compare how we acted before, in past situations, when the world was different, with what we have today, and determine whether in today's world we can still act as we did 10, or 20, or 30 years ago.

I see here representatives of very many theories such as "balancing on the brink of war," "containment," "rolling back communism"... But this has all become a thing of the past. And unless we realize this—we and you in the United States—it'll be hard, indeed, for the world to switch to another track, to take a new path, the path of improving international relations, of cooperation.

And you know, how strongly this need is felt by those around us—it is knocking at the doors, Soviet doors and

American doors, and we cannot under any circumstances turn a deaf ear to something whose time has come.

Such are the new realities. It seems that we have perceived them but, perhaps, we have not yet come to understand everything fully. Yet we have endeavored to perceive them and put them at the basis of our analysis, our vision of the world today. So while in the past we emphasized only the fact that we are different—and we are saying so today, and this should be realized, but not overdramatized—today we emphasize that we are all part of one and the same civilization. We are interconnected—through science and technology, through the environment, through the challenges that are growing and dictating to us that we must be united in our thoughts and actions. Isn't it the duty of intellectuals to communicate this perception to the peoples? I think this is the duty of all intellectuals. I told the President today it was desirable that there should be a scientific element in the elaboration of the policies of each nation, both domestic and foreign, and that people in the arts should make their ethical contribution to politics. For that purpose we are prepared not only to hold exchanges, but also to maintain cooperation, hold meetings in order to perceive the situation together from the viewpoint of universal human values.

I don't see any grounds for getting upset simply because we are different. Take any family, there are always different people living together in one family. Take the international community, can everyone in it be identical? It's an important fact: we are all different, yet we are one and the same civilization. Everything is interconnected. We will remain different, but we live in one and the same world, so let us all think what intellectual contribution we—the Soviet Union and the United States—can make, above all, from the viewpoint of awareness of the new realities, and how we can contribute to a restructuring of relations, first and foremost, between our two nations.

At this point, I would sincerely like to expound my vision of the present-day situation, to share my ideas as to where we stand and what our common responsibility is.

I cannot, for example, understand the people who reacted hostilely to the elements of cooperation and mutual understanding that appeared in the process of drafting the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. I fail to understand them as a human being, although this can be explained—it has to do with interests. Everything is explained by interests. But there are different kinds of interests. There

are the interests of the masses of people—including the American and Soviet people—and these are supreme interests. And the task of politicians is to express these interests, and not the narrow, selfish interests of some groups or strata in one or another society.

We do not claim to know the absolute truth on all matters, but we are prepared to make our contribution. We have intellectual resources ready to join in this process of perceiving the world and the process of building up a new relationship. I believe that both our countries have immense potentials in this respect.

As for the second part of my address, I can describe—just to keep you informed—the state of the restructuring of Soviet society at the current phase.

We initiated perestroika because we needed it. We could not live any longer in the way we had been living before. Of course, economically, we could have continued to move by the force of inertia. We could have still shown some growth and ensured a two or three percent rise of the national income. But that is not the point. We tried to take a fresh look at our society as a whole, and the major conclusion we came to was that the potential of the socialist system was not being utilized fully in terms of both the human factor and maneuvering with the help of a planned economy. So we took a look at our society in an attempt to understand it and ourselves, to find out what kind of a society we lived in. Glasnost and democratization were essential for this. These, of course, are complex and extremely deep-going processes. Their purpose is not to shake our society. We want to understand our society. And on the basis of an objective analysis, to build up a concept and then make our way intelligently through this very complicated period stage by stage. This is what we have initiated.

The quest is not an easy one, and it is not always easy for us to assess our historical past. We have had to call a spade a spade on many occasions. We have not yet said everything, have not yet sorted everything out, but we have got to the bottom of one thing, the most important thing which became the basis of the policy of perestroika. In short, over these two and a half years we have formed a view of the society we live in and tried to take a look at the future and the roads we will follow. We are moving ahead. The process is far from simple. There is no denying this. Comrade Zalygin, Editor of the magazine *Novy Mir*, is sitting here. From the experience of running his magazine, he can tell you how high feelings are

running in all spheres of our society—political, economic, intellectual and cultural, moral and social.

We will go along the chosen path. There is simply no alternative other than stagnation and marking time. Our people will simply not agree to this any more. But while on this road, we will put the conservatives in their place and, at the same time, prevent the skipping of stages and adventurism.

Quite a few meetings have been held in the past one and a half, two years. Yes, they were needed because revolutions have always started in this way. The entire society got into motion. And today, at a new stage, there is a growing need for difficult, serious, profound and responsible practical work. Now that we have started linking the concept with life, millions of people have become affected. The next two or three years will be the most painful. Everything must change—political institutions and the economic situation. Some of you, who are present here, have already written that we will not be able to cope with this task because we are trying to solve it on the basis of our socialist values. Let us wait and see. I am convinced that we will make it. We will borrow what is right for us from other economies and will link the interest of the individual with that of the public through relevant mechanisms, through new economic mechanisms, through improved centralism and election of economic managers.

When a person depends on the results of economic performance on the basis of cost-accounting he will no longer tolerate a loafer or an incompetent manager at the head of his enterprise. Now he needs a knowing, intelligent manager, one who is capable of successfully doing his job today and seeing ahead. That is why elections are needed. That is why we are spreading the process of democracy to the economy as well. Economic planning allows us to carry out structural changes less painfully.

I think that we are not using even fifty percent of our system's potential. We are only now beginning to realize what socialism is and what it can really yield. We are returning to Lenin. In his concluding years he gave much thought to the future of the country and saw that something was beginning to happen that impeded socialism as a system from spreading its wings. We are trying to understand this thought of Lenin's. Of course, we are not trying to apply his ideas mechanically to present-day life: the society, the country and the people have changed very much since then. We are making a big effort to

see how to tap socialism's potential—its economic, democratic, political, intellectual and moral potential.

It should also be remembered that 90-odd percent of the population are people who were born after the Revolution. They know no other government and no other system. And we will remake our society on the basis of this system's mainstays and values, as we perceive this system. This is our concern. I do not understand why it should worry Americans. It is only natural that our new thinking as regards processes inside the country and our approaches to them are making themselves felt also in our views on the world as a whole, in our relations with this world. In our view, international relations also need a perestroika. We cannot, however, impose it "by decision of the CPSU." This should be a result of the consent of the entire human community, of cooperation between all its members. We are open to dialogue, to a comparison of views, and to exchanges, and we respect the values and choice of each nation.

We will stick to our path, the path of perestroika regardless of the difficulties. It will become easier later on...

As for economic relations with America, I simply do not know how we can tolerate the state they are in any longer. We have virtually no links with you in this regard. True, this also shows that in this respect we both can live without one another. But is this the point that we wanted to prove to each other by our history? No. I think we have many mutual interests. Take our scientists, ask them about the interest with which they meet and exchange ideas. This is very important to them, I know, they cannot do without this. It would not be a normal situation if the scientists of the two biggest countries didn't have any contacts, were not enriching each other with their ideas. The same goes for other spheres. I know, for example, the opinion of your businessmen.

The time has come when we both really need to think everything over, determine where we are, what stage we have reached and analyse everything. Perhaps this will require another ten, twenty, thirty or a hundred meetings in order to determine at long last how we should live in this world. This question concerns both our two peoples and all the rest. America and the Soviet Union must find a way to cooperate, to draw closer together and, in the future, to be friends as well. Let us not hurry, let us not get euphoric, and let us take a responsible attitude. We do not need illusions, for stubborn realities exist. At the same time it is necessary to take the first step: everything starts with the first step.

If this visit and the things that have emerged in our relations over the last few years are now drawing energy from public sentiments and these sentiments are moving in this direction, then this means the ice has been broken. Personally, I am an optimist.

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV MEETS WITH LEADERS OF US CONGRESS

December 9, 1987

Due to common effort and meeting each other half way, we arrived at yesterday's event—a unique event in the history not only of our relations, but of international relations in general. A very big step has been taken. The initial reaction in the world to the act of signing the Treaty shows that it evoked a great response. Proceeding from yesterday's event, I would like to invite you all to ponder over how our two countries—the United States and the Soviet Union—are going to live together in this world of ours. For instance, I can feel there is a great desire among broad sections of the Soviet people for improving our relations. And I feel there is a similar movement among the American public. But if this mood of the people is not really perceived in political institutions, including such authoritative ones as US Congress, the Supreme Soviet, the United States Administration and the government of the USSR, this process will not have the necessary impetus.

On the eve of my departure for Washington I had several international meetings, specifically, with the Australian Prime Minister and the Zambian President. They have come from the opposite corners of the world. And all the conversations started with them telling me: you are going to the United States, do your best to have your relations start to change for the better. So we all bear a vast responsibility. And it is not only the responsibility to our peoples. Peoples the world over want our relations to improve. There is some progress in our relations on a political plane. More Senators and Congressmen now come to the Soviet Union. We have always attached much importance to such visits. And I am sure that you have seen for yourself that we all want the dialogue between parliamentarians to be serious, to become broader. That is my first point.

Now the second. Ahead lies the process of disarmament;

Taking part in the meeting were James C. Wright, Thomas S. Foley, Robert H. Michel, Tony Coelho, Trent Lott, Robert C. Byrd, Robert J. Dole, Alan Cranston and Alan K. Simpson.

that is by no means an easy process. What we want is to try and see to it that this burden be lightened as far as possible so that it should not press heavily on the United States and the Soviet Union. And when I say this, many of those whom I would call short-sighted people, would start speculating that Gorbachev is not having an easy time if he has come to the USA for talks about easing the burden of the arms race on the Soviet Union.

But this is not the case, I should say. The point is to have a true understanding of this problem. The arms race greatly complicates political dialogue and other ties and is affecting economic processes in both our countries. We can see how high are the mountains of arms we have amassed as a result of the arms race. And we are sitting atop that all. And just consider what would happen if these arms begin to work and we lose control of them. If we are all aware of that, we should try to move toward each other. I welcome the fact that through a difficult dialogue, realistic thought, nevertheless, is making a way for itself in public and political circles, both in the United States and in the Soviet Union. We believe the time has come for our political institutions, the main, supreme institutions, to become aware of this urgent need and realize it in politics.

Yesterday we took but a first step. Certainly, it relates to no more than five percent of the nuclear arsenals, but I think that its political importance is much greater, for the most difficult step has been taken. It seems to me that since the American side and the Soviet side have been very captious toward each other all the time and felt that this is not a simple matter, you should bear in mind that for the first time in our country this matter did not proceed smoothly. I told the President yesterday that many questions are asked in our society, questions are asked of the General Secretary and the government, openly, in the press, to say nothing of letters, whether the Soviet leadership was right in reducing three to four times greater volumes of nuclear weapons. For that matter, the Gallup Institute and our own institute of public opinion had a poll taken in the United States and the USSR, and it turned out that half of the population of the Soviet Union said that we should carefully consider whether or not the signing of this Treaty will damage the security interests of the Soviet Union. Now, that was news to us, I must tell you. So we feel that we will have to work with our public opinion and with the Supreme Soviet. Perhaps for the first time the process of ratification in our own country will not go through so easily. But insofar as I was deeply involved with the Treaty, including the details of its elaboration, I would like to say that it is a very seriously elaborated Treaty. And the main thing is that we had arrived at quite unprecedented machinery of verification. This is important not only for this Treaty. This also brings hope that when we approach the stage of cutting strategic arms, we can put to good use the experience we have gained. This is an example of how a coincidence of interests can be established and acted upon even in such a delicate matter as verification.

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TALKS TO US MEDIA EXECUTIVES AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY

December 9, 1987

Addressing the guests, Mikhail Gorbachev stressed that his visit had been a working one. A Treaty has been signed which for the first time eliminates nuclear weaponry—a major event in itself. "The US President, his advisers and I," said Mikhail Gorbachev, "have been seriously discussing a wide range of problems. We've got enough experience behind us to engage in a constructive dialogue.

"We have reached a stage," Mikhail Gorbachev went on to say, "at which broad strata of the population and representatives of many circles in both countries are eager to see for themselves whether we are doing everything in the area of Soviet-US relations in a way worthy of our two nations and our great powers.

"In the 40-odd years after the war we have proved we can do without each other, without maintaining either trade or other ties. Yet even in that kind of situation we have keenly felt each other's presence. Do we need to prove that we can do without each other? Don't we need to prove something different in politics, in our actions and in our dialogue and to look for ways to communicate, including through the mass media?

"The question is: Has the arms race made us happier? Someone might say: Yes, I'm happy because I've made money on weapons manufacturing. Someone else might say: I'm happy because my newspaper or magazine has made money on the arms race and the Cold War. But are there many people who are indifferent to the fate of the people, the fate of their country and, in terms of present-day realities, the fate of our civilization, and who are prepared to jeopardize it all as long as they continue making money? At the present level of development, I don't think that such people are in the majority. I am convinced that the feeling of responsibility and concern about the future of humankind prevails in today's world.

"People are straightforwardly asking: When will we learn to live and work normally? We can't always hark back to stereotypes and methods of action. We will be lost and unable to overcome tension.

"I am convinced that we must analyze the current situation in the world and take a realistic view of things. If we do this, we will find solutions in various areas—in dialogue, in disarmament, and in the economy."

Other speakers at the meeting stressed the importance of building up confidence and promoting cooperation between the Soviet and American mass media. They also pointed out that scientists of both the United States and the Soviet Union have greatly contributed to the achievement of the agreement on the elimination of the intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles.

Pondering the role of scientists, Mikhail Gorbachev said: "I think a mistake was made when the views of Einstein and his colleagues were not heeded. They warned that the world had obtained a force that required a new approach. At that time people did not take a sufficiently responsible attitude to it, and now the fruits of their lack of respect for the views of scientists are being reaped. We need the opinions of scientists and their competence. We have seen how the world has listened to the opinion of the movement 'International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.' Lown and Chazov promoted this idea, and look at the response it has received the world over. This is because knowledgeable people with a clear idea of what the consequences of a nuclear war would be started speaking out. This has had an enormous impact.

"Contacts are now being established between our scientists in physics and mathematics. Scientists have made a number of valuable suggestions, and we used them and found ways to move toward the Treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. During the talks we proposed forming a committee of Soviet and American scientists. Let them submit their appraisals to the leadership so that we might

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Participating were Robert L. Bernstein, Random House Inc.; Cornelia Bessie, Harper & Row Publishers Inc.; Lous D. Boccardi, Associated Press; David Cohen, Collins Publishers; Stanton R. Cook, *Chicago Tribune*; Max Frankel, *The New York Times*; Katharine Graham, *Washington Post* Co.; William Hyland, *Foreign Affairs*; T. Johnson, *The Los Angeles Times*; Jason D. McManus, *Time* Inc.; Cordon Manning, NBC News; Thomas S. Murphy, ABC Inc.; G. Piel, *Scientific American* Inc.; Warren Phillips, *The Wall Street Journal*; John C. Quinn, *USA Today*; Robert Wright, NBC; Stuwart Richardson, Richardson & Steirman; Stephen B. Shepard, *Business Week*; Richard M. Smith, *Newsweek*; Betty Smith, International Publishers Co. Inc.; Howard Stringer, CBS News; Martin E. Tash, Plenum Publishing Corp.; Larry Tisch, CBS; R.E. Turner, WTBS; Alberto Vitale, Bantam-Doubleday-Dell Publishers Inc.; and Mortimer B. Zuckerman, *U.S. News & World Report*, and others.

know the worth of this or that political decision we are in the process of taking."

Representatives of the leading mass media were especially interested in the Soviet Union's policies of perestroika and glasnost.

"As for our problems," Mikhail Gorbachev said, "we have named them, and we have embarked upon the road of renewal, upgrading political institutions, democracy, the form of economic management, and of enriching spiritual environment. We have termed our plans 'perestroika.' Our pivotal task is to involve the public in all this and make the people real participants in the restructuring drive. This cannot be done without the media, without glasnost. For this reason we will be broadening openness and stimulating constructive criticism and responsibility. It is not sensationalism that is needed. We need reflections that will move people and awaken in them a desire to work hard for the benefit of their country and to find their place in the common endeavor. Of course, such a process involves a clash of opinions, and the press must show this realistically, in a civic-minded spirit, not just in a way to boost sales. The main thing is that society should receive answers to the questions of concern to it through the media.

"We will be broadening constructive criticism and democratic principles in our mass media. They have helped us at the first stage, and we are counting on their help at the next stage in the realization of our plans. Here we pin our hopes on the press and its energetic involvement. But the press itself cannot be outside the realm of control and criticism. It, too, should be subject to criticism and control from the people.

"I think that the greatest and most reliable guarantee that these processes will be positive and stable is that politicians have come under close public scrutiny and that the scientific community and cultural figures are becoming very actively involved in international politics. Evidently the peoples of our two countries and of the entire world have grown tired of politicians failing to respond to the imperatives of the present-day world. A synthesis of politics, science and culture, and the energetic participation of public movements and their advance to the forefront of the international political scene are the guarantee that no one will be able to manipulate the peoples as was the case in the past. Everyone has realized that things can't go on as they have been. I see that as the chief guarantee. Politics has come out of the offices and corridors of power. It has now emerged on the expanses of the broad

international arena; people who are interested in the preservation of peace are entering this arena."

During the talks the American participants also raised the issue of human rights in the USSR, referring to alleged facts that often figure in the American mass media.

Mikhail Gorbachev said: "Your information has absolutely nothing to do with the real state of things. In fact, we do not even have such a notion as 'political crimes,' we have only the concept of crimes against the state. We will defend our system against those who want to undermine it, just as all other states do. Why should capitalism and capitalist law have the right to defend the capitalist system, and socialism not?

"So it happens that some things recognized as lawful in the US are regarded as unlawful in the Soviet Union.

"The President asked me yesterday: 'Why do you set emigration quotas? Why not allow everyone wishing to leave to do so?'

"I replied: 'And you, Mr. President, why do you set immigration quotas? You have installed barbed wire fences and placed submachine-gunners along your border with Mexico to prevent people from that country from entering the United States. And at the same time you demand unlimited emigration from the Soviet Union. What kind of logic is that?' The President replied that the US cannot take in all the Mexicans.

"But how can you be so sure that all of them will abandon their native land, Mexico, in order to come to the United States?

"We have now let everyone wishing to emigrate to do so. We are not letting out those who have worked at defense enterprises or are associated with computer technology, arms development or control systems, because they hold state secrets. Every state protects its secrets. Why then should we be some sort of fools who don't care about the future of their state and its defense capability?

"Instead of speculating on these issues, we should take a look at a concept that US legislation implements. If we do so we shall see that it ignores social and economic rights. All over the world America is being criticized for that. It does not sign international agreements to this effect. Who then has given it the moral right to adopt the pose of a teacher with respect to the rest of the international community and to preach to us? I told the President yesterday: 'Mr. President, you are not a prosecutor, nor am I a defendant.'

"'If you want discussions on these and other issues in a

broad context, let's have them. And, by the way, let's have them through the press.'

"Our press has now started giving over entire pages to Western correspondents on which they are free to publish their reports and views unabridged. The newspaper *Izvestia*, for example, has printed a complete interview with the US President with his accusations of the Soviet leadership. We are not afraid of criticism. Your criticism is often unconvincing. It is disrespectful toward our people and this also makes us disrespect it. It can only appeal to the groups of extremists who are dissatisfied with society."

Mikhail Gorbachev cited concrete instances of misinformation being spread when various rumors had been picked up by the Russian services of the Voice of America, BBC and other stations. "If," said the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, "the Western mass media are trying to present the Soviet Union in a bad light, that means that we have started something positive and that perestroika is tackling major tasks. If there are such vigorous attempts to kill the interest in that policy, that means that our perestroika is a serious thing both for us and for the rest of the world."

In the course of the talk concrete proposals were made for an exchange of editors of various publications between the Soviet Union and the USA.

Mikhail Gorbachev supported that idea, saying that the very idea of contacts and closer mutual understanding was very important. He promised that the Soviet side would give careful thought to those questions and consider the organizational forms.

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV MEETS WITH PROMINENT US BUSINESSMEN

December 10, 1987

I very much appreciate this opportunity to meet with members of the business community whose activities are connected with the very foundations of the life of peoples and states.

Over the 40 years since the war we have proved that we can get by without each other. We have managed without each other surprisingly well. In so doing, we have spent enormous funds on the arms race and find ourselves together atop a huge powder keg, not knowing what will become of us now. We must break the trend. We must see each other as partners rather than enemies. Now that a major impulse has been given to political dialogue and to the process of disarmament, a favorable situation is emerging for giving joint thought to how we shall trade and develop economic relations.

We could become useful to each other. We are convinced that it would be beneficial to American business to launch operations in the Soviet Union. We are confident that such interaction will to a certain extent—and I don't want to conceal this—make it easier for us to solve our problems. We regard ourselves as a part of the world economy. One doesn't really have to be a specialist to realize the need for cooperation between our vast countries.

We have been thinking about this and have done a great deal in this direction in our legislation. We have adopted political decisions on cooperation. This process is currently picking up speed. I would like you now, using new forms and new approaches, to take a more active part in this joint search. Why? Because I think that logic is such and history is such that there is no way we can escape one another. It could be that you would like to get rid of the Soviet Union so that it would not be an obstacle. It could be that somebody in my country as well would like to get rid of America so that it

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Among the businessmen present at the meeting were C. T. Acker, Dwayne Andreas, Armand Hammer, Barron Hilton, James H. Giffen, Donald M. Kendall, David Kearns, Robert D. Kennedy, Leonard Lauder, Richard J. Mahoney, Hamish Maxswell, John J. Murphy, John A. Petti, David Rockefeller, Felix Rohatin, Edson Spenser, R. E. Turner, Richard D. Wood, and A. W. Clausen as well as the Honorable C. William Verity, US Secretary of Commerce.

would not be an obstacle. But I think that these people are unrealistic in their thinking.

America and the Soviet Union are the biggest realities of our time. And since that is so we must live, coexist. And it would be even better if we did not simply live and coexist, but also cooperated. The feelings of our peoples toward one another are changing, and this is very important as well. People want rapprochement, mutual understanding and an atmosphere of trust between our countries, for them to get to know each other better. The current Soviet leadership has advanced a course of perestroika and a new policy for our country. It views foreign economic ties as a very important aspect of cooperation with other nations both from the standpoint of domestic interests and in terms of strengthening international relations and putting them on a real basis, on commercial interests.

All peoples and nations are interrelated. We have a common interest—to rid ourselves of the threat of nuclear weapons, preserve peace and tackle global problems, the consequences of the scientific and technological revolution, ecological problems, backwardness and poverty. We should try to do this by joint effort. This is the first point. Secondly, we believe that if we become more dependent on each other in the economic sphere, we will act more responsibly toward each other in the political sphere. This is all rather dialectical and interrelated. The Soviet government and the organizations which are connected with the economy and which are now making use of new economic mechanism and implementing radical economic reforms, proceed from the premise that economic cooperation and trade between our countries are one of the factors for domestic development and for a more stable international situation.

You have, of course, taught us some lessons over the past decade and we have become cautious as well. It is no longer so easy to draw us into this cooperation. I told this to the President as well. When we were deprived of 17 million tons of grain in two days—which was in the middle of winter—and we had to look for ways of obtaining that grain (you know that this happened when the embargo was declared), this led us to the conclusion that we cannot be oriented toward the United States alone. It turned out that America could use economic ties in order to take us by the throat. That was one lesson. Here's the other. We tied ourselves to the West through buy-back agreements, equipment purchases, licenses and some accessories, and then suddenly the COCOM lists and other impediments emerged. So when the problem arose

of how we should go about fulfilling our tasks, strategic, scientific, engineering and technological, we said: No, we won't allow any further underestimation of our own machine-building and our own science, which possesses a tremendous potential. We have now doubled investments in machine-building and boosted outlays in some areas of computer engineering between five and seven times. We are developing all these advanced technologies, all these advanced areas in order to overcome our lagging behind. We have already sensed how actively our scientists, technicians, specialists and designers have become involved in the efforts to cope with the problem and have seen how much talent we have in reserve.

We have learned our lessons and shall not allow our national interests to be exposed to another blow. This does not mean, though, that we are against large-scale projects and large-scale cooperation. No, nevertheless we are for that. We shall combine cooperation with the work on the tasks we have outlined for ourselves. And if there's anybody who wants to be on this, help us and receive his benefits, we invite him to do this. We invite him and will look for approaches and create prerequisite conditions for such cooperation. I am talking to you plainly and bluntly to make it clear that we don't want to be cunning with you. It must be clear: we invite you to cooperate. Everyone willing to join in will get the support of both the government and the political leadership, not to mention that of economic and business quarters.

We should think about how to develop trade, since duties on our goods are as high as 75 percent. Can one trade in this way? Is this trade? Can the Soviet Union put up with such a disrespectful attitude? Our people are perplexed by this. Let's think how to get rid of these trammels. We realize that cooperation won't develop if you find it unprofitable. But let's also think about how to make sure that we'll be interested in going to the American market with our goods. To rearrange political, economic and cultural relations, involve broad popular masses in exchanges, draw our peoples closer together and create prerequisites for cooperation, we need to start with clearing away the logjams. I am very supportive, for example, of the consortium idea which has been suggested by the American side. We are very interested in it. A consortium of our own has already been formed. This is why when the leading centers of these consortiums have been established, they will be able to make contacts. And such a meeting is planned for the immediate future. This is a very interesting idea because we have projects that cannot be handled by just one firm. There are very big projects. This is why it is essential

to pool efforts. Think this over. We would welcome this. Joint ventures are another new form. As a matter of fact, the President and I have ended our talks with a concluding document which contains good passage on trade between our countries. The business community could rely on this joint statement. So now you have a political document which will serve you and help you broaden contacts and ties.

This is what I would like to wind up my speech here with. I invite you to cooperation. I know that sitting before me are people who can be called realists. They may take a great deal of time thinking and weighing the pros and cons of getting into this or that project. But I also know that they can accept the realities, appreciate them and move toward new approaches and new realities.



Appendices

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability,

Convinced that the measures set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security, and

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty which includes the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols which form an integral part thereof, each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, not have such systems thereafter, and carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty.

Article II

For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. The term "ballistic missile" means a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. The term "ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM)" means a ground-launched ballistic missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

2. The term "cruise missile" means an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. The term "ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)" means a ground-launched cruise missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

3. The term "GLBM launcher" means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector launcher mechanism for launching a GLBM.

4. The term "GLCM launcher" means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLCM.

5. The term "intermediate-range missile" means GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability in excess of 1,000 kilometers but not in excess of 5,500 kilometers.

6. The term "shorter-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1,000 kilometers.

7. The term "deployment area" means a designated area within which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles may operate and within which one or more missile operating bases are located.

8. The term "missile operating base" means:

(a) in the case of intermediate-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located within a deployment area, at which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate, in which support structures associated with such missiles and launchers are also located and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located; and

(b) in the case of shorter-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located any place, at which shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate and in which support equipment normally associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located.

9. The term "missile support facility," as regards intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, means a missile production facility or a launcher production facility, a missile repair facility or a launcher repair facility, a training facility, a missile storage facility or a launcher storage facility, a test range, or an elimination facility as those terms are defined in the Memorandum of Understanding.

10. The term "transit" means movement, notified in accordance with paragraph 5 (f) of Article IX of this Treaty, of an intermediate-range missile or a launcher of such a missile between missile support facilities, between such a facility and a deployment area or between deployment areas, or of a shorter-range missile or a launcher of such a missile from a missile support facility or a missile operating base to an elimination facility.

11. The term "deployed missile" means an intermediate-

range missile located within a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base.

12. The term "non-deployed missile" means an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base.

13. The term "deployed launcher" means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base.

14. The term "non-deployed launcher" means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base.

15. The term "basing country" means a country other than the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or the United States of America on whose territory intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles of the Parties, launchers of such missiles or support structures associated with such missiles and launchers were located at any time after November 1, 1987. Missiles or launchers in transit are not considered to be "located."

Article III

1. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types of intermediate-range missiles are:

(a) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RSD-10, the R-12 and the R-14, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-20, the SS-4 and the SS-5, respectively; and

(b) for the United States of America, missiles of the types designated by the United States of America as the Pershing II and the BGM-109G, which are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designations.

2. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types of shorter-range missiles are:

(a) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the OTR-22 and the OTR-23, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-12 and the SS-23, respectively; and

(b) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing

IA, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation.

Article IV

1. Each Party shall eliminate all its intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers, support structures or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party.

2. To implement paragraph 1 of this Article, upon entry into force of this Treaty, both Parties shall begin and continue throughout the duration of each phase, the reduction of all types of their deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. These reductions shall be implemented in two phases so that:

(a) by the end of the first phase, that is, no later than 29 months after entry into force of this Treaty:

(I) the number of deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 171 warheads;

(II) the number of deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 180 warheads;

(III) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads;

(IV) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads; and

(V) the ratio of the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range GLBMs of existing types for each Party to the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles of existing types possessed by that Party shall not exceed the ratio of such intermediate-range GLBMs to such intermediate-range missiles for that Party as of November 1, 1987, as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding; and

(b) by the end of the second phase, that is, no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, all intermediate-range missiles of each Party, launchers of such missiles and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, shall be eliminated.

Article V

1. Each Party shall eliminate all its shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than 18 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party.

2. No later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all its deployed shorter-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. No later than 12 months after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all its non-deployed shorter-range missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

3. Shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall not be located at the same elimination facility. Such facilities shall be separated by no less than 1,000 kilometers.

Article VI

1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, neither Party shall:

(a) produce or flight-test any intermediate-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles; or

(b) produce, flight-test or launch any shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles.

2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party

shall have the right to produce a type of GLBM not limited by this Treaty which uses a stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM having more than one stage, providing that that Party does not produce any other stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM.

Article VII

For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. If a ballistic missile or a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

2. If a GLBM or GLCM is an intermediate-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles. If a GLBM or GLCM is a shorter-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles.

3. If a GLBM is of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the earth, it shall not be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of this Treaty apply.

4. The range capability of a GLBM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum range to which it has been tested. The range capability of a GLCM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1,000 kilometers shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability in excess of 1,000 kilometers but not in excess of 5,500 kilometers shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles.

5. The maximum number of warheads an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile carries shall be considered to be the number listed for missiles of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

6. Each GLBM or GLCM shall be considered to carry the maximum number of warheads listed for a GLBM or GLCM of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

7. If a launcher has been tested for launching a GLBM or

a GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching GLBMs or GLCMs.

8. If a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLBM or GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLBM or GLCM.

9. The number of missiles each launcher of an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile shall be considered to be capable of carrying or containing at one time is the number listed for launchers of missiles of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

10. Except in the case of elimination in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination, the following shall apply:

a) for GLBMs which are stored or moved in separate stages, the longest stage of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM shall be counted as a complete missile;

b) for GLBMs which are not stored or moved in separate stages, a canister of the type used in the launch of an intermediate-range GLBM, unless a Party proves to the satisfaction of the other Party that it does not contain such a missile, or an assembled intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM, shall be counted as a complete missile; and

c) for GLCMs, the airframe of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLCM shall be counted as a complete missile.

11. A ballistic missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLBM if it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLBM launchers. A cruise missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLCM if it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLCM launchers.

12. Each Party shall have the right to produce and use for booster systems, which might otherwise be considered to be intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, only existing types of booster stages for such booster systems. Launches of such booster systems shall not be considered to be flight-testing of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles provided that:

a) stages used in such booster systems are different from stages used in those missiles listed as existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles in Article III of this Treaty;

b) such booster systems are used only for research and

development purposes to test objects other than the booster systems themselves;

c) the aggregate number of launchers for such booster systems shall not exceed 35 for each Party at any one time; and

d) the launchers for such booster systems are fixed, emplaced above ground and located only at research and development launch sites which are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding.

Research and development launch sites shall not be subject to inspection pursuant to Article XI of this Treaty.

Article VIII

1. All intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Intermediate-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.

2. Stages of intermediate-range missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or moving between deployment areas, between missile support facilities or between missile support facilities and deployment areas.

3. Until their removal to elimination facilities as required by paragraph 2 of Article V of this Treaty, all shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located at missile operating bases, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.

4. Transit of a missile or launcher subject to the provisions of this Treaty shall be completed within 25 days.

5. All deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or in subsequent updates of data pursuant to paragraphs 3, 5(a) or 5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty. Neither Party shall increase the number of, or change the location or boundaries of, deployment areas, missile operating bases or missile support facilities, except for elimination facilities, from those set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding. A missile support facility shall not be considered to be part of a deployment area even though it may be located within the geographic boundaries of a deployment area.

6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party shall locate intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, including stages of such missiles, or launchers of such missiles at missile production facilities, launcher production facilities or test ranges listed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

7. Neither Party shall locate any intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles at training facilities.

8. A non-deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile shall not be carried on or contained within a launcher of such a type of missile, except as required for maintenance conducted at repair facilities or for elimination by means of launching conducted at elimination facilities.

9. Training missiles and training launchers for intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles shall be subject to the same locational restrictions as are set forth for intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles in paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article.

Article IX

1. The Memorandum of Understanding contains categories of data relevant to obligations undertaken with regard to this Treaty and lists all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, possessed by the Parties as of November 1, 1987. Updates of that data and notifications required by this Article shall be provided according to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.

2. The Parties shall update that data and provide the notifications required by this Treaty through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, established pursuant to the Agreement Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.

3. No later than 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide the other Party with updated data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.

4. No later than 30 days after the end of each six-month interval following the entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide updated data for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding by informing the other Party of all changes, completed and in process, in that data, which have occurred during the six-month

interval since the preceding data exchange, and the net effect of those changes.

5. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall provide the following notifications to the other Party:

a) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the elimination of a specific deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility;

b) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of changes in the number or location of elimination facilities, including the location and scheduled date of each change;

c) notification, except with respect to launches of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, no less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the initiation of the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and stages of such missiles, and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, including:

(I) the number and type of items of missile systems to be eliminated;

(II) the elimination site;

(III) for intermediate-range missiles, the location from which such missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers are moved to the elimination facility; and

(IV) except in the case of support structures, the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this Treaty and the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility;

(d) notification, no less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date of the launch, or the scheduled date of the initiation of a series of launches, of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, including:

(I) the type of missiles to be eliminated;

(II) the location of the launch, or, if elimination is by a series of launches, the location of such launches and the number of launches in the series;

(III) the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this Treaty; and

(IV) the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility;

(e) notification, no later than 48 hours after they occur, of changes in the number of intermediate-range and shorter-

range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers resulting from elimination as described in the Protocol on Elimination, including:

(I) the number and type of items of a missile system which were eliminated; and

(II) the date and location of such elimination: and

(f) notification of transit of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles, or the movement of training missiles or training launchers for such intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, no later than 48 hours after it has been completed, including:

(I) the number of missiles or launchers;

(II) the points, dates and times of departure and arrival;

(III) the mode of transport; and

(IV) the location and time at that location at least once every four days during the period of transit.

6. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall notify the other Party, no less than 10 days in advance, of the scheduled date and location of the launch of a research and development booster system as described in paragraph 12 of Article VII of this Treaty.

Article X

1. Each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

2. Verification by on-site inspection of the elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination shall be carried out in accordance with Article XI of this Treaty, the Protocol on Elimination and the Protocol on Inspection.

3. When a Party removes its intermediate-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers from deployment areas to elimination facilities for the purpose of their elimination, it shall do so in complete deployed organisational units. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, these units shall be SS-20 regiments composed of two or three battalions. For the United States of America, these units shall be Pershing II batteries and BGM-109G flights.

4. Elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment

associated with such missiles and launchers shall be carried out at the facilities that are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or notified in accordance with paragraph 5 (b) of Article IX of this Treaty, unless eliminated in accordance with Sections IV or V of the Protocol on Elimination. Support structures, associated with the missiles and launchers subject to this Treaty, that are subject to elimination shall be eliminated *in situ*.

5. Each Party shall have the right, during the first six months after entry into force of this Treaty, to eliminate by means of launching no more than 100 of its intermediate-range missiles.

6. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles which have been tested prior to entry into force of this Treaty, but never deployed, and which are not existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of this Treaty, and launchers of such missiles, shall be eliminated within six months after entry into force of this Treaty in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. Such missiles are:

a) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RK-55, which is known to the United States of America as the SSC-X-4; and

b) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IB, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation.

7. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be considered to be eliminated after completion of the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination and upon the notification provided for in paragraph 5 (e) of Article IX of this Treaty.

8. Each Party shall eliminate its deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities. A Party shall notify the other Party pursuant to paragraph 5 (a) of Article IX of this Treaty once the conditions set forth below are fulfilled:

a) all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been removed;

b) all support structures associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been eliminated; and

c) all activity related to production, flight-testing, training, repair, storage or deployment of such missiles and launchers has ceased there.

Such deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities shall be considered to be eliminated either when they have been inspected pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XI of this Treaty or when 60 days have elapsed since the date of the scheduled elimination which was notified pursuant to paragraph 5 (a) of Article IX of this Treaty. A deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility listed in the Memorandum of Understanding that met the above conditions prior to entry into force of this Treaty, and is not included in the initial data exchange pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty, shall be considered to be eliminated.

9. If a Party intends to convert a missile operating base listed in the Memorandum of Understanding for use as a base associated with GLBM or GLCM systems not subject to this Treaty, then that Party shall notify the other Party, no less than 30 days in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of the conversion, of the scheduled date and the purpose for which the base will be converted.

Article XI

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections. The Parties shall implement on-site inspections in accordance with this Article, the Protocol on Inspection and the Protocol on Elimination.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections provided for by this Article both within the territory of the other Party and within the territories of basing countries.

3. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at all missile operating bases and missile support facilities specified in the Memorandum of Understanding other than missile production facilities, and at all elimination facilities included in the initial data update required by paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty. These inspections shall be completed no later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty. The purpose of these inspections shall be to verify the number of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment and other data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, provided pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty.

4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to verify the elimination, notified pursuant to paragraph 5 (a) of Article IX of this Treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than missile production facilities, which are thus no longer subject to inspections pursuant to paragraph 5 (a) of this Article. Such an inspection shall be carried out within 60 days after the scheduled date of the elimination of that facility. If a Party conducts an inspection at a particular facility pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article after the scheduled date of the elimination of that facility, then no additional inspection of that facility pursuant to this paragraph shall be permitted.

5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections pursuant to this paragraph for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty. Each Party shall have the right to conduct 20 such inspections per calendar year during the first three years after entry into force of this Treaty, 15 such inspections per calendar year during the subsequent five years, and ten such inspections per calendar year during the last five years. Neither Party shall use more than half of its total number of these inspections per calendar year within the territory of any one basing country. Each Party shall have the right to conduct:

(a) inspections, beginning 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than elimination facilities and missile production facilities, to ascertain, according to the categories of data specified in the Memorandum of Understanding, the numbers of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment located at each missile operating base or missile support facility at the time of the inspection; and

(b) inspections of former missile operating bases and former missile support facilities eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty other than former missile production facilities.

6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right, for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty, to inspect by means of continuous monitoring:

(a) the portals of any facility of the other Party at which the final assembly of a GLBM using stages, any of which is outwardly similar to a stage of a solid-propellant GLBM listed in Article III of this Treaty, is accomplished; or

(b) if a Party has no such facility, the portals of an agreed former missile production facility at which existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs were produced.

The Party whose facility is to be inspected pursuant to this paragraph shall ensure that the other Party is able to establish a permanent continuous monitoring system at that facility within six months after entry into force of this Treaty or within six months of initiation of the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a). If, after the end of the second year after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party conducts the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a) for a period of 12 consecutive months, then neither Party shall have the right to inspect by means of continuous monitoring any missile production facility of the other Party unless the process of final assembly as described in subparagraph (a) is initiated again. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, the facilities to be inspected by continuous monitoring shall be: in accordance with subparagraph (a), for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic; in accordance with subparagraph (b), for the United States of America, Hercules Plant Number 1, at Magna, Utah.

7. Each Party shall conduct inspections of the process of elimination, including elimination of intermediate-range missiles by means of launching, of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers carried out at elimination facilities in accordance with Article X of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination. Inspectors conducting inspections provided for in this paragraph shall determine that the processes specified for the elimination of the missiles, launchers and support equipment have been completed.

8. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers eliminated pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Elimination, and of training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers eliminated pursuant to sections II, IV and V of the Protocol on Elimination.

Article XII

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use

national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Neither Party shall:

(a) interfere with national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article; or

(b) use concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by national technical means of verification carried out in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. This obligation does not apply to cover or concealment practices, within a deployment area, associated with normal training, maintenance and operations, including the use of environmental shelters to protect missiles and launchers.

3. To enhance observation by national technical means of verification, each Party shall have the right until a Treaty between the Parties reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms enters into force, but in any event for no more than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, to request the implementation of cooperative measures at deployment bases for road-mobile GLBMs with a range capability in excess of 5,500 kilometers, which are not former missile operating bases eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty. The Party making such a request shall inform the other Party of the deployment base at which cooperative measures shall be implemented. The Party whose base is to be observed shall carry out the following cooperative measures:

(a) no later than six hours after such a request, the Party shall have opened the roofs of all fixed structures for launchers located at the base, removed completely all missiles on launchers from such fixed structures for launchers and displayed such missiles on launchers in the open without using concealment measures; and

(b) the Party shall leave the roofs open and the missiles on launchers in place until 12 hours have elapsed from the time of the receipt of a request for such an observation.

Each Party shall have the right to make six such requests per calendar year. Only one deployment base shall be subject to these cooperative measures at any one time.

Article XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Special Verification Commission. The Parties agree that, if

either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Special Verification Commission to:

(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; and

(b) agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty.

2. The Parties shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers which provide for continuous communication between the Parties, to:

(a) exchange data and provide notifications as required by paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Article IX of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination;

(b) provide and receive the information required by paragraph 9 of Article X of this Treaty;

(c) provide and receive notifications of inspections as required by Article XI of this Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection; and

(d) provide and receive requests for cooperative measures as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XII of this Treaty.

Article XIV

The Parties shall comply with this Treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions.

Article XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XVI

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

Article XVII

1. This Treaty, including the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols, which form an integral part thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

M. Gorbachev,
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

R. Reagan,
President of the United States of America

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON THE SETTING OF INITIAL DATA IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

The Memorandum cites data presented by the Parties regarding their intermediate- and shorter-range missiles and launchers for those missiles as well as the support structures and support equipment associated with those missiles and launchers.

Subject to elimination by the Soviet Party are 826 deployed and non-deployed IRMs, including 470 deployed IRMs; and by the American Party 689 IRMs, including 429 deployed IRMs.

As regards the SRMs, the Soviet Party will eliminate 926 deployed and non-deployed missiles and the American Party 170 such missiles.

The various data included in the Memorandum apply to about 100 facilities for the Soviet Party and to more than 30 facilities in the US and on the territory of five West European basing countries. As is known, the Soviet IRMs are deployed exclusively on the territory of the USSR, while the respective American systems are on the territory of the following US NATO allies: West Germany, Britain, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands.

The document specifies deployment areas and missile operating bases, gives their exact geographical location and cites data on the number of deployed IRMs, their launchers and support structures and support equipment associated with those missiles and launchers at those facilities.

Detailed data is provided, too, with regard to the deployed and non-deployed SRMs of the Parties, launchers for those missiles and support equipment associated with those missiles and launchers. In particular, there is data concerning both the Soviet SRMs deployed and not deployed on the territory of

the USSR and the Soviet SRMs deployed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, as well as the American SRMs stored on the territory of the US. There is also data concerning the location of storage and missile and launcher repair facilities, training centers and elimination facilities.

Also cited are the Soviet and American plants manufacturing IRMs and SRMs and their launchers and the exact geographical location of those works.

In the USSR there are four such plants and in the US five. Subject to permanent observations are the plants for the production of ballistic IRMs in the cities of Votkinsk (USSR) and Magna (USA), while verification on a periodic basis within the framework of quota inspections of the non-production of launchers for ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles will be effected at the plants in the cities of Volgograd, Petropavlovsk and Sverdlovsk in the USSR and at the plants in the cities of Middle River and San Diego in the USA. The other missile plants listed in the Memorandum will not be inspected.

A special section in the Memorandum is devoted to Specifications for IRMs and SRMs and for the support structures and support equipment associated with those missiles and their launchers (size, weight, etc.).

Attached to the Memorandum are photographs of the missiles, launchers and support structures and support equipment subject to elimination, and also layouts of the installations subject to inspection.

PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE ELIMINATION OF THE MISSILE SYSTEMS COVERED BY THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

The Protocol on Procedures specifies the elements of missile systems subject to elimination, and the order and methods of eliminating missiles, launchers and support equipment and facilities.

The intermediate-range missiles shall be eliminated within a period of three years in two stages, the first of which will last for 29 months. The process of elimination shall commence simultaneously for the USSR and for the USA. The United States shall reduce all types of missiles on a proportional basis so that the initial ratio between the ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles subject to elimination be maintained. Shorter-range missiles shall be eliminated within eighteen months.

Missiles are subject to elimination along with their nuclear warheads, including 72 American warheads for West German Pershing 1A missiles.

The Protocol provides for the elimination of missiles by explosive demolition or burning, and, in the case of an agreed-upon number of intermediate-range missiles, by launching. The front section of a missile will be crushed or flattened in a press, and the nuclear charge shall be subject to utilization.

Launchers and support equipment shall be eliminated by making them unsuitable for use as military technology. Former mobile launch installations and transporter vehicles (prime movers) can be used in the economy.

Missile systems shall be eliminated at sites specially agreed upon by the Parties. The Soviet Union shall have eight and the United States two such sites.

Thus, the Protocol on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles lays down exhaustive data on how the elimination of missiles shall proceed.

PROTOCOL REGARDING INSPECTIONS RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

The Protocol contains provisions assuring effective verification of compliance with the Treaty during the time of elimination of intermediate-range missiles (i.e., three years) and shorter-range missiles (within one year and a half) and within the subsequent ten years.

Verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty shall be carried out in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty (on inspection), the Protocol on Inspection and the Protocol on Elimination. An important role is allotted to national technical means of verification.

On-site inspections are provided for both within the territories of the USSR and the USA and the territories of the countries where the missiles to be destroyed are located: the GDR and Czechoslovakia, on the one hand; and the FRG, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands on the other.

The total number of inspections the USSR may conduct within the territory of the USA and in the West European countries for the 13 years of operation of the verification mechanism is about 240; the USA may carry out a total of about 400 inspections in the USSR, Czechoslovakia and the GDR.

The following types of inspections are provided for:

Inspections to check the initial data. They shall begin 30 days, and be completed no later than 90 days, after entry into force of the Treaty.

Inspections to confirm the elimination of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than missile production facilities. These inspections shall be conducted for three years, i.e., during the time of elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles.

Inspections of nonproduction of missiles at producer plants, one for either Party, shall be conducted by means of continuous monitoring of the portals for the absence of missile output, and for the nonproduction of ballistic and cruise missile launchers within the framework of quota inspections.

Inspections at sites of elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers.

Inspections on a quota basis shall be conducted for 13 years at all missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than missile production facilities. The USSR and the USA have the right to conduct 20 such inspections each per calendar year during the first three years after entry into force of the Treaty and respectively 15 and 10 such inspections per calendar year during the subsequent first and second five-year periods.

The Protocol contains the general obligations of the Parties regarding the procedure for sending notifications of the intention to conduct an inspection, the obligations of the inspecting and inspected Parties with respect to such notifications, the procedure for the entry, reception and delivery of inspectors to an inspection site, including the procedure for the use of monitoring devices, the general rules for the conduct of inspections and so forth.

Annexed to the Protocol are the Provisions on Privileges and Immunities of Inspectors and Aircrew Members.

A procedure for the conduct of inspections within the territories of basing countries shall be fixed by agreements with them pursuant to the appropriate Soviet-American understandings on inspection.

STATEMENT BY THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE US SECRETARY OF STATE

In accordance with the joint statement on the problems relating to nuclear testing, adopted in Washington on September 17, 1987, the USSR and the United States are proceeding to design a joint verification experiment. This experiment would be conducted as soon as possible at the test sites of each other (respectively in Semipalatinsk and Nevada) for the purpose of the elaboration of improved verification measures for the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. These verification measures will, to the extent appropriate, be used in further nuclear test limitation agreements which may subsequently be reached.

For the purpose of the joint verification experiment, each side will provide the other side with an opportunity to measure the yield of one or two explosions at each side's test site with yields not less than 100 kilotons and approaching 150 kilotons.

For the purpose of the joint verification experiment, each side will have the opportunity, on the basis of complete reciprocity, to measure the yields of the explosions for verification purposes, using: teleseismic methods; and, at the other side's test site, hydrodynamic yield measurement methods in a satellite hole. As a yield standard, the experiment will include yield measurement by means of a hydrodynamic method in the emplacement hole.

The joint verification experiment will not be designed to produce statistically significant result, but will be conducted in such a way as to address all other concerns identified by either side regarding methods proposed by the other side for verification of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. The sides have also agreed that the experiment will give sufficient information to resolve these concerns by providing an example of the effectiveness of the verification methods used in the joint verification experiment and by demonstrating their practicability and non-intrusiveness. The experiment will thus provide the basis for agreeing on those verification measures which could be used by either side to verify compliance by the other side with the provisions of the 1974 and 1976 treaties. The

understanding has been reached that in the future each side will be entitled to apply any or all of these agreed verification measures.

In order to develop and reach agreement on specific technical and organizational parameters of the joint verification experiment the sides have agreed to establish ad hoc working groups at their negotiations.

In order to help prepare themselves to design and conduct the joint verification experiment, the sides have agreed to exchange visits of delegations to the two sides' nuclear test sites. These visits, to the USSR Semipalatinsk test site and the US Nevada test site, will take place in January 1988 as the preliminary work of the next negotiating round in Geneva.

ВСТРЕЧА В ВЕРХАХ

Вашингтон, 7—10 декабря 1987 года

Документы и материалы

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